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PREJUDICIAL CHARACTER EVIDENCE:  
HOW THE CIRCUITS APPLY OLD CHIEF 
TO FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 403 
Hannah J. Goldman* 
 
It is a fundamental principle of the American justice system that a 
defendant should be judged on the facts of the case at issue and not for the 
defendant’s general character or past indiscretions.  Federal Rule of 
Evidence 404, which prohibits character evidence, addresses this issue.  
Rule 403 represents another principle of the justice system:  the legal 
system favors admissibility of evidence over its exclusion.  There are some 
exceptions to this principle, including when evidence is so highly 
prejudicial that it outweighs the benefits of its admission.  As 404(b) 
character evidence is almost always highly prejudicial to the defendant, 
trial judges are often asked to use their discretion to decide when to admit 
404(b) evidence. 
The lower courts often have been inconsistent when applying Rule 403 to 
404(b) evidence.  Understanding when to admit or exclude 404(b) evidence 
becomes more complicated when the defendant offers to concede to a point 
so that the prosecution does not need to introduce 404(b) evidence in order 
to prove it.  In Old Chief v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court 
addressed this issue.  The holding, however, was narrowly tailored to its 
facts and provided little guidance in other cases.  In addition, the Court 
introduced new concepts for trial judges to consider when deciding whether 
to admit 404(b) evidence.  This Note examines the discrepancies in lower 
courts’ methods for admitting 404(b) evidence in light of Old Chief and 
offers a unifying and comprehensive test for trial judges to use when faced 
with this issue. 
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Johnny Lynn Old Chief was a convicted felon.1  He served a little more 
than seven years in prison on two separate charges, including assault 
resulting in serious bodily injury.2  On October 23, 1993, he was once again 
arrested for his alleged role in a drunken fight that resulted in a gunshot 
putting a hole in the fender of someone’s car.3  There was contradicting 
evidence on who fired the shot, but the gun belonged to a friend of Old 
Chief’s and only one fingerprint was found on the pistol, which did not 
 
 1. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 174–75 (1997). 
 2. D. Michael Risinger, John Henry Wigmore, Johnny Lynn Old Chief, and 
“Legitimate Moral Force”:  Keeping the Courtroom Safe for Heartstrings and Gore, 49 
HASTINGS L.J. 403, 447–49 (1998). 
 3. Id. at 403.  No one was injured. Id. 
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belong to Old Chief.4  Old Chief was subsequently charged with assault 
with a dangerous weapon and possession of a firearm during a crime of 
violence.5  As a convicted felon, he also was charged as a felon in 
possession of a firearm.6  With such weak evidence against him, Old Chief 
pled not guilty.7 
One of the elements of a felon-in-possession charge is that the defendant 
has a prior felony conviction.8  Old Chief’s plea of not guilty put his 
convicted felon status at issue in the case, requiring the prosecution to prove 
the status element beyond a reasonable doubt.9  To prove the convicted 
felon status, the prosecution chose the prior conviction that most closely 
resembled the current charge, putting “a powerful weapon in the 
prosecution’s hands to introduce evidence of the sort generally explicitly 
forbidden by the propensity rule.”10  Old Chief was left in a catch-22:  he 
had a strong case that he was not guilty, but by so pleading, he opened the 
door for the prosecution to introduce his prior conviction to the jury.11  By 
pleading not guilty at trial, the jury learned that Old Chief had previously 
committed the same crime for which he was currently charged.12 
This evidence may well have dispelled the jury’s doubt about whether 
Old Chief ever possessed the gun or used it on that day, practically sealing 
his fate.13  In an attempt to avoid this outcome, Old Chief’s defense counsel 
offered to stipulate to the prior felony status element of the conviction.14  
The prosecution refused to accept the stipulation, and the district court 
allowed the evidence of Old Chief’s prior assault conviction as permissible 
404(b) evidence to prove an element of the crime.15  Old Chief was 
sentenced to fifteen years in prison.16 
The importance of Rule 404(b) cannot be overstated.  Numerous studies 
show that the effects on a jury of admitting 404(b) evidence are virtually 
 
 4. Id. at 446–48. 
 5. Id. at 448. 
 6. Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 174–75. 
 7. See Risinger, supra note 2, at 450–51. 
 8. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006).  Almost any prior felony conviction will do, but 
there are some qualifications. See infra notes 149, 193 and accompanying text. 
 9. See Risinger, supra note 2, at 419.  A plea of not guilty puts every element of an 
offense at issue for the prosecution to prove. See id. 
 10. Id. at 420.  The “propensity rule” refers to Federal Rule of Evidence 404, which 
explains when evidence of one’s prior crimes, wrongs, or other acts are permitted or 
prohibited at trial. FED. R. EVID. 404.  Rule 404(a) generally prohibits the prosecution from 
admitting a defendant’s prior criminal convictions if the defendant does not testify. See id.  
Rule 404(b)(2) explains when evidence, otherwise prohibited under Rule 404(a) as character 
evidence, may nevertheless be permissible to prove certain elements of the crime with which 
the defendant is charged. See id.  This Note refers to this type of evidence as “404(b) 
evidence.” 
 11. See Risinger, supra note 2, at 450–51. 
 12. Id. 
 13. See id. 
 14. See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 175 (1997). 
 15. Id. at 177. 
 16. See Risinger, supra note 2, at 448.  This sentence was later vacated and remanded. 
See id. at 448 n.110. 
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irreversible,17 regardless of any limiting instruction the judge issues to the 
jury.18  While it has long been a staple of the U.S. judicial system to judge a 
defendant only for the act for which he is charged, and not for the person he 
appears to be,19 it is human nature to look at a person’s character when 
deciding his guilt.  In Old Chief’s case, the trial judge concluded that there 
was a permissible purpose for the 404(b) evidence, but that does not answer 
the question of whether the evidence should have passed the Rule 403 
balancing test and ultimately been admitted at trial.20 
Scholars and courts have hotly debated Rule 404 since its inception.21  
The circuit courts have never agreed on when to allow 404(b) evidence at 
trial.22  This is especially true when a judge is faced with a defense offer to 
stipulate to an element of the crime that 404(b) evidence purportedly 
addresses.23  Under Rule 403, the trial judge must decide whether to admit 
404(b) evidence by weighing the probative value of the evidence against its 
potential prejudicial effect.24  This balancing methodology is often where 
lower courts differ.  The divergence among the circuits’ interpretation of 
these rules has become even more pronounced over the last eighteen years.  
 
 17. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, 1 FEDERAL EVIDENCE 
§ 1:41 (4th ed. 2013); see also Other Crimes Evidence at Trial:  Of Balancing and Other 
Matters, 70 YALE L.J. 763, 777 (1961) [hereinafter Other Crimes]; Daniel C. Richman, Old 
Chief v. United States:  Stipulating Away Prosecutorial Accountability?, 83 VA. L. REV. 
939, 944–45 (1997) (suggesting that a juror who learns about a defendant’s prior bad acts 
might believe the defendant is more likely to have committed the crime in question, demand 
less of the government either consciously or subconsciously, or, if unsure about guilt, lean 
toward convicting the defendant for reasons of convenience). 
 18. For purposes of this Note, a “limiting instruction” is a type of explanation that trial 
judges give to the jury to explain that it may only use certain evidence to make definitive, 
limited conclusions. See EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, 2 UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE 
§ 9:73–74 (2008). 
 19. See Other Crimes, supra note 17, at 776–77.  Over a century ago, the U.S. Supreme 
Court held that bad act evidence 
tend[s] to prejudice the defendants with the jurors, to draw their minds away from 
the real issue, and to produce the impression that [the defendants] were wretches 
whose lives were of no value to the community, and who were not entitled to the 
full benefit of the rules prescribed by law for the trial of human beings. 
Boyd v. United States, 142 U.S. 450, 458 (1892). 
 20. This Note discusses the admissibility of 404(b) evidence, and specifically focuses on 
when a court should permit 404(b) evidence at trial and when it should exclude the evidence 
for failure to pass the Rule 403 balancing test. 
 21. See Stephanie Yost, Note, Reversals of Fortune:  How the Ninth Circuit Reviews 
Erroneously Admitted “Other Acts” Evidence Under Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b), 23 
SW. U. L. REV. 661, 661 (1994) (citing Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Need to Amend Federal 
Rule of Evidence 404(b):  The Threat to the Future of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 30 
VILL. L. REV. 1465, 1467 (1985)). 
 22. See infra Parts I.B, II. 
 23. See infra Parts I.B, II.  While the defense may offer to stipulate to—or concede—an 
element of a crime in order to avoid the admission of 404(b) evidence, the prosecution need 
not accept the offer, leaving the trial judge with discretion to proceed with the evidence 
under a Rule 403 balancing test. See infra Parts I.B, II.  For purposes of this Note, a 
stipulation refers to a defense offer to stipulate, not an official evidentiary admission.  When 
a trial court accepts a proffered stipulation, the stipulation manifests itself in a “must 
convict” jury instruction. See infra Part I.B.3. 
 24. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b) advisory committee’s note. 
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In 1997, in Old Chief v. United States,25 Old Chief’s case was brought to 
the U.S. Supreme Court.  In Old Chief, the Court overturned the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and held that the prosecution must accept a 
defense offer to stipulate to the status element because the prior 
conviction’s prejudicial effect outweighs its probative worth under Rule 
403.26  Lower courts have interpreted the Court’s holding in Old Chief in 
various ways, and a majority of circuits continue to afford the trial judge 
broad discretion when ruling on the admissibility of 404(b) evidence.27 
This Note explores the different ways lower courts use the Rule 403 
balancing test to determine the admissibility of 404(b) evidence at trial in 
the face of alternative evidence.  Part I of this Note focuses on the 
background of Rules 404 and 403 and how courts have interpreted these 
rules differently, resulting in inconsistent admissions of 404(b) evidence.  
This part also analyzes the degree to which lower courts in the 1980s and 
1990s weighed the probative value of 404(b) evidence against its 
prejudicial effect when alternative evidence was available,28 concluding 
with a discussion of the 1997 Supreme Court decision of Old Chief.  Part II 
discusses how Old Chief affected circuit courts’ interpretations of the Rule 
403 balancing test with regard to 404(b) evidence.  This part analyzes how 
circuits interpret Old Chief in different ways, resulting in a more divided 
circuit landscape.  It demonstrates how some circuits interpret Old Chief to 
overrule its 404(b) admissibility jurisprudence in spite of available 
alternative evidence, and it shows how some circuits interpret Old Chief to 
further its method of Rule 403 balancing, whether or not the court’s method 
is permissive of 404(b) evidence under these circumstances.  Finally, Part 
III of this Note explores how courts might better understand Old Chief and 
presents a unified Rule 403 balancing test for admitting 404(b) evidence in 
light of the teachings of Old Chief. 
I.  OLD CHIEF IN CONTEXT:  UNDERSTANDING HOW THE COURT CAME TO 
ITS RULE 403 HOLDING ON 404(B) ADMISSIBILITY AND STIPULATIONS 
Part I of this Note discusses the background of the Old Chief decision.  
Part I.A discusses Rules 404 and 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence and 
analyzes how they intersect.  Then, Part I.B addresses the different ways 
that a defendant may seek to exclude relevant and otherwise permissible 
404(b) evidence and how the circuits approached these possibilities prior to 
Old Chief.  Finally, Part I.C presents a thorough analysis of the Old Chief 
opinion. 
 
 25. 519 U.S. 172 (1997). 
 26. Id. at 191–92. 
 27. This Note analyzes whether 404(b) evidence is admissible under Rule 403, and 
assumes, unless otherwise asserted, that the other acts evidence in question has a permissible 
404(b) purpose. 
 28. See FED. R. EVID. 403 (requiring lower courts to engage in this balancing test). 
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A.  Federal Rules of Evidence 404 and 403 
The Federal Rules of Evidence were enacted in 197229 and, in the decade 
following, no individual evidence rule generated more reported court 
decisions than Rule 404(b).30  Rule 404(b) states that “[e]vidence of a 
crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in 
order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance 
with the character,”31 essentially barring the use of other acts evidence to 
show a person has a propensity to act in a certain way.32  The second 
sentence of Rule 404(b), however, permits the use of other acts evidence for 
other nonpropensity purposes, “such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of 
accident.”33  The advisory committee’s notes state that there is no 
“mechanical solution” for when to admit or bar 404(b) evidence, but rather, 
under the Rule 403 balancing test, a judge must consider the availability of 
other means of proof before determining whether to permit the evidence.34  
Thus, in order for 404(b) evidence to be permissible, it not only needs to 
fall under the “permissible uses” in 404(b), but it also must survive the Rule 
403 balancing test. 
As mentioned above, Rule 403 provides that courts may exclude 
otherwise relevant evidence if “its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice.”35  The advisory committee 
defined “unfair prejudice” as a “tendency to suggest decision on an 
improper basis, commonly . . . an emotional one,” or to use evidence for an 
 
 29. FED. R. EVID. historical note. 
 30. See Yost, supra note 21, at 661. 
 31. FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(1). 
 32. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b) advisory committee’s note (stating that 404(b) “deals with 
a specialized but important application of the general rule excluding circumstantial use of 
character evidence” (emphasis added)); DAVID P. LEONARD, THE NEW WIGMORE:  EVIDENCE 
OF OTHER MISCONDUCT AND SIMILAR EVENTS § 1.2 (2009). 
 33. FED. R. EVID. 404(b). 
 34. Id. advisory committee’s note.  It should be noted that before even reaching this 
point, the evidence must be relevant under Rule 401.  Rule 401 states that “[e]vidence is 
relevant if:  (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be 
without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” FED. R. 
EVID. 401.  Notably, for Rule 401 relevancy purposes, it does not matter if other means of 
proof exist or if the element the evidence would be used to prove is at issue in the case—that 
is what the Rule 403 balancing test is for. See id. advisory committee’s note (“The fact to 
which the evidence is directed need not be in dispute.  While situations will arise which call 
for the exclusion of evidence offered to prove a point conceded by the opponent, the ruling 
should be made on the basis of such considerations [under Rule 403] . . . rather than under 
any general requirement that evidence is admissible only if directed to matters in dispute.”). 
 35. FED. R. EVID. 403.  In the Preliminary Draft of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the 
drafters required the exclusion of evidence that is outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice 
and provided for judicial discretion—as in the Rule’s current form—for exclusion involving 
undue delay, waste of time, or cumulative evidence. See Kathryn Cameron Walton, Note, An 
Exercise in Sound Discretion:  Old Chief v. United States, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1053, 1066–67 
(1998).  Upon the recommendation of the Department of Justice, this draft was rejected as 
virtually unreviewable due to the ambiguity of phrases like “substantially outweighed” and 
“undue prejudice” and the threat that trial courts would classify evidence to fit the demands 
of the rule. See id. 
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impermissible purpose.36  Furthermore, it is proper to consider other means 
of proof in weighing the probative value of the evidence against the 
potential for unfair prejudice.37  In other words, while the advisory 
committee’s notes to Rule 404(b) paint it as a rule of inclusion,38 the 
drafters crafted Rule 403 to address, among other things, the concerns that 
are inherent in admitting 404(b) evidence.39 
What can a defendant do when the government wants to admit 404(b) 
evidence—such as a prior conviction—for a permissible purpose, such as to 
prove knowledge?  One option is to offer to stipulate to the fact that the 
defendant has the requisite knowledge to commit the crime with which he is 
charged, conceding that the prosecution no longer needs to prove 
knowledge.40  Another option is to not dispute the element at trial, thereby 
conceding that it is proved on its face.41  Lastly, the defense can request that 
the judge instruct the jury that if all the elements other than knowledge are 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury “must convict”42 the 
defendant.43 
The theory behind each of these options is premised on reducing or 
eliminating the probative value of the 404(b) evidence to such an extent that 
Rule 403 requires the court to exclude the evidence as insufficiently 
probative to justify its cumulative effect or high degree of prejudice.44  If 
the prosecution still wants to use the prior conviction to prove knowledge, 
the advisory committee notes require the trial judge to consider these 
alternative methods of proof, which may be less prejudicial to the 
defendant.45  The degree to which circuit courts considered these alternative 
methods, and the degree to which the courts believed they reduced the 
probative value of the evidence, varied widely, resulting in the admissibility 
of 404(b) evidence in some circuits and exclusion in others.46 
 
 36. FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee’s note. 
 37. See id. 
 38. See LEONARD, supra note 32, § 4.3.2. 
 39. See Yost, supra note 21, at 669. 
 40. See, e.g., United States v. Mohel, 604 F.2d 748, 753 (2d Cir. 1979); see also infra 
Part I.B.1. 
 41. See, e.g., United States v. Silva, 580 F.2d 144, 148 (5th Cir. 1978); see also infra 
Part I.B.2. 
 42. For a description of “must convict” jury instructions, see supra note 23 and 
accompanying text. 
 43. See, e.g., United States v. Crowder (Crowder I), 87 F.3d 1405 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en 
banc), vacated, 519 U.S. 1087 (1997), rev’d en banc, 141 F.3d 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1998); see 
also infra Part I.B.3.  These three methods are not mutually exclusive. 
 44. See Daniel J. Buzzetta, Note, Balancing the Scales:  Limiting the Prejudicial Effect 
of Evidence Rule 404(b) Through Stipulation, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 389, 392 (1994). 
 45. FED. R. EVID. 404(b) advisory committee’s note; see also Buzzetta, supra note 44, at 
407–08. 
 46. See infra Parts I.B, II.  Rule 403 left the decision to admit potentially unfair 
prejudicial evidence to the judge by stating purposefully broad categories for exclusion, 
requiring a discretionary balancing of probative worth against prejudicial value. See Donnie 
L. Kidd, Jr., Pretending to Upset the Balance:  Old Chief v. United States and Exclusion of 
Prior Felony Conviction Evidence Under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 
231, 237 (1998). 
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In reviewing the circuits’ approaches to dealing with these methods, 
judges and commentators have analyzed divisions among the lower courts 
in different ways.  For instance, prior to Old Chief, the D.C. Circuit divided 
the Third and Fifth Circuits into one camp, the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and 
Ninth Circuits into another, and the First, Second, Eighth, and Eleventh 
Circuits into a third.47  Meanwhile, one commentator split the Sixth, Eighth, 
and Ninth Circuits into one camp and the First, Fourth, Tenth, and D.C. 
Circuits into another.48  The Eighth Circuit was cited on both sides of the 
debate, indicating inconsistent application of the law even within a single 
circuit.49 
B.  How Defendants Can Attempt to Exclude 404(b) Evidence 
Circuit courts have responded inconsistently to the available methods that 
defense teams use to convince a trial judge to exclude 404(b) evidence.  
Some circuits factored proffered stipulations into their balancing test and 
some did not.50  Some believed that a stipulation or not bringing the 
element into issue at trial, coupled with a jury instruction, required 
excluding 404(b) evidence, while others did not.51  Notably, alleged errors 
in admission of 404(b) evidence formed the most common ground for 
appeal in many jurisdictions.52  Circuit courts therefore have become “a 
crucial battleground in the fight to limit district judges’ discretion in 
applying this rule.”53  This section discusses the different approaches lower 
 
 47. See Crowder I, 87 F.3d at 1409–10; see also Richard M. Thompson II, The Perfect 
Storm:  Rule 404(b), Unequivocal Stipulations, and Old Chief’s Dicta on Narrative Integrity 
and Evidentiary Richness, 37 NEW. ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 55, 64–65 (2011). 
 48. Scott Patterson, Old Chief v. United States:  Radical Change or Minor Departure?  
How Much Further Will Courts Go in Limiting the Prosecution’s Ability to Try Its Case?, 49 
MERCER L. REV. 855, 857–59 (1998). 
 49. Compare United States v. Smith, 520 F.2d 544, 548 (8th Cir. 1975), abrogated by 
Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997) (holding that the government is not required 
to accept a defendant’s stipulation in lieu of 404(b) evidence), with United States v. Jenkins, 
7 F.3d 803, 806 (8th Cir. 1993), overruling recognized by United States v. Johnson, 439 F.3d 
947, 952 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that 404(b) evidence is permissible to prove intent if the 
defendant’s theory is that he was not part of the alleged crime at all), and United States v. 
Thomas, 58 F.3d 1318, 1323 (8th Cir. 1995) (overruling the district court’s decision to 
prohibit 404(b) evidence because a defense stipulation took it out of the dispute on the 
grounds that Jenkins sets a high bar and the stipulation was not made with sufficient clarity). 
 50. See infra Part II.B.1; see also United States v. Taylor, 17 F.3d 333, 338–39 (11th 
Cir. 1994) (“Further, where the defendant offers to stipulate to the issue the government 
seeks to prove, evidence of prior convictions is inadmissible.” (citing United States v. Costa, 
947 F.2d 919, 925 (11th Cir. 1991))); United States v. Breitkreutz, 8 F.3d 688, 690–92 (9th 
Cir. 1993) (“A stipulation thus has no place in the Rule 403 balancing process.”), abrogated 
by Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 190–91; United States v. Mohel, 604 F.2d 748, 754 (2d Cir. 1979) 
(“The record must reflect, as it does here, an unequivocal concession of the element by the 
defendant.  Once that offer is made, the other-crime evidence should be excluded.”). 
 51. See infra Part II.B.2; see also United States v. Mounts, 35 F.3d 1208, 1217 (7th Cir. 
1994) (holding that exclusion of evidence is not required when there is a sufficient jury 
instruction); United States v. Tarricone, 996 F.2d 1414, 1421 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that 
“evidence is not relevant to an issue” if the issue is not disputed). 
 52. See Yost, supra note 21, at 662. 
 53. Id. 
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courts used in dealing with each of these three methods prior to the Old 
Chief decision.54 
1.  Defense Offers to Stipulate 
A defendant may offer to stipulate to exclude 404(b) evidence that does 
not directly relate to the currently charged crime.55  A sufficient stipulation 
may diminish the probative value of the 404(b) evidence to the point that it 
no longer outweighs its prejudicial effect under a Rule 403 balancing test.56  
In United States v. Mohel,57 a leading decision on this method, defendant 
Michael Mohel was charged with possession of cocaine with intent to 
distribute.58  Nelson Griffith was a cooperating witness for the prosecution 
and provided the most damaging evidence against Mohel.59  Against 
vigorous objection by the defense, Griffith testified that shortly after his 
arrest, he told Mohel that he had heard that Mohel had been ripped off by 
two men in jail, and that Mohel responded, “if he [hadn’t been] ripped off 
he would have been something.”60  Agent Swint, who arrested Mohel, 
testified that when he told Mohel that he knew Mohel had been ripped off 
for cocaine in the past, Mohel replied, “I don’t know how I can help you in 
that area.  The two individuals that I was fronting for are no longer in the 
country.”61  On appeal, the Second Circuit held that these two statements 
suggesting Mohel’s previous involvement with cocaine were inadmissible 
404(b) evidence.62 
The government argued that the evidence was admissible to prove 
Mohel’s knowledge of the cocaine and intent to sell it, two necessary 
elements of the crime charged.63  The record left no doubt, however, that 
the defense sought to remove intent and knowledge from the case.64  The 
defense’s theory was that the alleged sale was a complete fabrication and 
that Griffith was a liar, and therefore, defense counsel repeatedly offered to 
stipulate to the elements of intent and knowledge.65  The defense conceded 
that if the jury found that Mohel had in fact sold the cocaine, then there was 
no need to prove knowledge or intent.66  Both at pretrial conference and on 
the first day of the trial, the defense counsel informed the court that it would 
not dispute the elements of knowledge and intent and that if the jury found 
 
 54. For a discussion of the circuits’ varying approaches in the aftermath of Old Chief, 
see infra Part II. 
 55. See David A. Sonenshein, The Misuse of Rule 404(b) on the Issue of Intent in the 
Federal Courts, 45 CREIGHTON L. REV. 215, 242 (2011). 
 56. See infra note 82 and accompanying text. 
 57. 604 F.2d 748 (2d Cir. 1979). 
 58. See id. at 750. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 751. 
 62. See id. at 755 (reversing the conviction and remanding for a new trial). 
 63. See id. at 751. 
 64. See id. at 752. 
 65. See id. 
 66. See id. 
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that the alleged transaction took place, knowledge and intent could be 
inferred from the transaction.67 
The defense argued that because knowledge and intent were not at issue 
at trial, the 404(b) evidence was inadmissible.68  The Second Circuit agreed 
that “[s]uch an unequivocal offer of stipulation” removed the elements as 
issues in the case.69 
The Second Circuit further held that a written stipulation was not 
necessary, but rather it was enough for the defense to “unequivocally offer[] 
the concession and then act[] accordingly.”70  As the defense took this 
approach in Mohel, the court held that the government could not evade the 
defense’s unequivocal offer to stipulate to intent and knowledge for the 
purpose of creating a dispute that would give the 404(b) evidence a 
permissible purpose for admission.71 
The Second Circuit revisited its holding in Mohel a decade later, in 
United States v. Colon.72  The issue on appeal in Colon was whether 
testimony was properly admitted concerning two prior occasions in which 
Onel Colon, the defendant, had participated in the sale of heroin.73  As in 
Mohel, the government argued that the evidence was admissible to prove 
knowledge and intent.74  The court examined Colon’s defense theories at 
trial in order to determine whether the 404(b) evidence had been properly 
admitted.75 
The defense counsel posited two opposing theories:  first, that Colon 
gestured to the undercover officer that he might find drugs down the street, 
but not to the dealer in particular;76 second, that Colon did not remember 
ever being approached by the undercover officer.77  Because the defense 
was unsure prior to trial which theory it would pursue, the trial judge 
permitted the 404(b) evidence.78 
 
 67. See id. 
 68. See id. 
 69. Id. at 753 (figuring that because “other crimes evidence is inadmissible to prove 
intent when that issue is not really in dispute,” the evidence is inadmissible (quoting United 
States v. Williams, 577 F.2d 188, 191 (2d Cir. 1978))). 
 70. Id. at 754. 
 71. See id. at 754.  The court emphasized that “[t]he record must reflect, as it does here, 
an unequivocal concession of the element by the defendant.  Once that offer is made, the 
other-crime evidence should be excluded.” Id. 
 72. 880 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 73. See id. at 653. 
 74. See id. at 654. 
 75. See id. at 653.  The case revolved around Colon’s involvement in the sale of heroin 
and whether he facilitated a drug sale to an undercover officer by pointing the officer in the 
direction of the dealer down the street. See id. 
 76. See id. at 654.  On this theory, the trial judge allowed the evidence, finding that it 
could be used to prove intent. See id. 
 77. See id.  The defense argued that, under this theory, knowledge and intent would not 
be at issue, because the only question would be whether the interaction between Colon and 
the officer happened in the first place. See id.  The defense was prepared to concede that if 
the jury found that the officer had approached Colon, then the elements of knowledge and 
intent could be considered proven. See id. at 658–59. 
 78. See id. at 655. 
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The Second Circuit reversed.79  While the court agreed that the evidence 
would be admissible to prove intent if the defense argued that Colon 
innocently directed the officer toward the dealer, the court was convinced 
that the defense argued the second theory and that, as in Mohel, the offer to 
stipulate to intent removed the issue from the case.80  The stipulation in 
Colon was much less explicit than the one in Mohel, but the court 
nevertheless found that changing the defense theory reaffirmed the 
defendant’s proffered stipulation.81 
Mohel and Colon are two examples of the Second Circuit’s approach to 
dealing with stipulations:  if defense counsel offers to stipulate to an 
element of the crime which the prosecution claims the 404(b) evidence 
proves, and the stipulation suffices to remove the issue from the case, the 
trial judge should exclude the evidence.  This approach does not label the 
evidence irrelevant under Rule 401; rather, it diminishes the probative value 
of the evidence so that, under Rule 403, the evidence’s prejudicial effect 
outweighs its probative value.82 
Prior to Old Chief, other circuits adopted the Second Circuit’s approach.  
The Eleventh Circuit, for example, followed a rule that prohibited the 
prosecution from introducing 404(b) evidence to prove an element of a 
crime if the defense has offered to stipulate to the element.83  Similar to the 
Second Circuit, the stipulation must sufficiently remove the element as an 
issue in the case.84  The First85 and D.C.86 Circuits also took similar 
approaches to defense offers to stipulate.  For example, in United States v. 
Crowder87 (Crowder I), the D.C. Circuit held that “[w]hile a defendant’s 
concession or offer to stipulate is not ‘proof,’ it may serve the same 
function, and the trial judge should factor it into the 403 balance.  That is 
the analysis the Advisory Committee envisioned, and it is one this court has 
endorsed.”88 
 
 79. See id. at 656. 
 80. See id. at 658–59. 
 81. See id. at 659. 
 82. See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 179 (1997) (citing the Federal Rules of 
Evidence and holding that exclusion of otherwise relevant evidence must be based on the 
Rule 403 balancing test); see also infra Part I.C.1. 
 83. See United States v. Taylor, 17 F.3d 333, 338 (11th Cir. 1994) (citing United States 
v. Costa, 947 F.2d 919, 925 (11th Cir. 1991)). 
 84. See id. at 339.  In Taylor, the defense’s proffered stipulation to intent was 
insufficient because the prosecution wanted to introduce the 404(b) evidence to prove 
knowledge, motive, and absence of mistake as well, and thus, the 404(b) evidence still had 
high probative value on issues not stipulated. See id. 
 85. See United States v. Tavares, 21 F.3d 1, 3–4 (1st Cir. 1994) (en banc) (holding that 
forcing the prosecution to accept a stipulation to the status element in a felon-in-possession 
case does not weaken the prosecution’s argument). 
 86. See Crowder I, 87 F.3d 1405, 1407–10 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc), vacated 519 U.S. 
1087 (1997), rev’d en banc 141 F.3d 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding that the 404(b) 
evidence offered by the prosecution to prove intent and knowledge “is inadmissible because 
the defendant’s concession of intent and knowledge deprives the evidence of any value other 
than what Rule 404(b) . . . unambiguously prohibits”). 
 87. 87 F.3d 1405 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc), vacated 519 U.S. 1087 (1997), rev’d en 
banc 141 F.3d 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
 88. Id. at 1422–23 (citation omitted). 
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Meanwhile, the Ninth Circuit took the absolute opposite view.  In United 
States v. Breitkreutz,89 the court emphatically held that the government is 
permitted to admit 404(b) evidence despite an explicit and unequivocal 
offer to stipulate to the proffered element.90  The court reasoned that a 
defense stipulation does not relieve the prosecution of its burden of proving 
every element of the crime.91  Further, the court held that the defense “goes 
astray in presuming that a proffered stipulation is an alternative means of 
proof which the district court should consider in its [Rule] 403 
balancing. . . .  A stipulation is not proof . . . [and] has no place in the Rule 
403 balancing process.”92 
2.  Element Not Contested 
The idea behind stipulating to an element of a crime is that the element is 
no longer at issue in the case.  Similarly, the defendant can remove an issue 
in a case by not contesting it at trial.93  The defense theory is that if the 
element is not contested, the facts of the case will speak for themselves, and 
the jury will hold that the element is proved.94  There are some crimes, for 
example, where a mental element of the crime will be inferred from the act 
of the crime itself if the mental element is not contested.95 
Under these circumstances, the Second Circuit once again adopted a 
novel position.  In United States v. Figueroa,96 the court held that if the 
prosecution wants to offer 404(b) evidence to prove elements such as 
knowledge or intent, then it may only do so at the conclusion of the 
defendant’s case.97  This approach allows the trial judge to determine if the 
issue the evidence is supposed to prove is actually in dispute before 
weighing its probative value against its prejudicial effect.98  In a similar 
vein, if the prosecution seeks to admit 404(b) evidence under another 
rubric, such as identity or common scheme, then—absent a defense theory 
that the defendant did not commit the alleged act—the evidence may be 
 
 89. 8 F.3d 688 (9th Cir. 1993), abrogated by Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 
(1997). 
 90. See id. at 690–91 (finding that a court cannot compel the prosecution to accept a 
stipulation because it would allow the defendant to “plead out” an element of the offense). 
 91. See id. at 690 (citing Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 69 (1991)). 
 92. See id. at 691–92. 
 93. See United States v. Tarricone, 996 F.2d 1414, 1421 (2d Cir. 1993) (“In some 
circumstances the very nature of a defense put forward by the defendant may itself remove 
an issue from a case.”). 
 94. See, e.g., United States v. Payne, No. 93-5381, 1994 WL 36849, at *4 (6th Cir. Feb. 
8, 1994) (“Because of the large amount of crack cocaine in defendant’s possession and the 
evidence that this amount had an approximate street value of $1,700, there was sufficient 
evidence from which a jury could properly conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that 
defendant had an intent to distribute the crack cocaine.”). 
 95. See supra notes 93–94; see also Sonenshein, supra note 55, at 249 (“Thus, by 
merely proving the actus reus in the vast majority of criminal prosecutions, the government 
has already offered sufficient evidence of intent from which the fact finder can find guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 
 96. 618 F.2d 934 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 97. See id. at 939. 
 98. See id. at 938–39. 
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offered during the prosecution’s case-in-chief.99  This allows the judge to 
determine if the 404(b) evidence has any probative value, for a purpose 
other than to prove character, before admitting the evidence.100 
In addition to laying out this new procedure, the Figueroa court also held 
that an unequivocal offer to stipulate is unnecessary to remove an issue 
from dispute to exclude 404(b) evidence.101  Here, the government sought 
to admit evidence that the defendant, Ralph Acosta, was previously 
convicted of selling narcotics to prove that he intended to deal heroin.102  At 
no point during the trial, however, did Acosta’s counsel question whether 
Acosta intended to sell heroin or if he instead intended to sell some other 
non-narcotic substance.103  Counsel made clear that this was not his 
defense; instead, he denied that the alleged conduct occurred at all.104  The 
Second Circuit held that Acosta’s counsel raised no issue concerning 
Acosta’s intent and so “had sufficiently removed that issue from the 
case.”105 
While the government argued that Acosta did not remove intent as a 
disputed issue in the case,106 the court held that whether an issue remains 
“sufficiently in dispute” does not depend on the words used, but depends 
rather on the effect that the trial court gives to the words.107  Therefore, 
while a stipulation suffices to remove an issue from dispute, it is not always 
necessary.108  Instead, defense counsel may remove an issue from dispute if 
counsel were to 
express a decision not to dispute that issue with sufficient clarity that the 
trial court will be justified (a) in sustaining objection to any subsequent 
cross-examination or jury argument that seeks to raise the issue and (b) in 
charging the jury that if they find all the other elements established 
beyond a reasonable doubt, they can resolve the issue against the 
defendant because it is not disputed.109 
A formal stipulation is not required; rather, it is enough for the defense to 
not contest the issue during trial.110 
Similarly, in United States v. Estabrook,111 the Eighth Circuit affirmed 
that its general rule was to “delay admission of 404(b) evidence until after 
the defense rests.”112  The court reasoned that this was the best time to 
 
 99. See id. 
 100. See id. 
 101. See id. at 942. 
 102. See id. at 939. 
 103. See id. at 940.  If this had been his defense, then evidence may have been permitted 
to prove knowledge or absence of mistake. 
 104. See id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. See id. at 941. 
 107. See id. at 942. 
 108. See id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. See id.  The Figueroa court proceeded to discuss jury instructions, which this Note 
considers in the next section. 
 111. 774 F.2d 284 (8th Cir. 1985). 
 112. Id. at 289. 
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determine whether the issue the 404(b) evidence seeks to prove was really 
in dispute and to properly weigh its probative worth and prejudicial 
effect.113 
Predictably, other circuits disagreed with this approach.  The Seventh 
Circuit expressly rejected the Figueroa approach in United States v. 
Mounts,114 relying on its precedent that entitles the government to introduce 
404(b) evidence to prove intent even when the defendant has not disputed 
intent.115  The Third Circuit concluded that its case law precluded it from 
accepting the Second Circuit approach116 but left “the door open” for 
district courts to exclude 404(b) evidence when a defendant makes it clear 
that he is not contesting the issue.117 
3.  “Must Convict” Jury Instructions 
Even when a court accepts a defense stipulation or agrees that the 
element at issue is not disputed, the trial judge must give the jury some 
explanation on how to deliberate.118  The jury instruction, which often goes 
hand-in-hand with the first two defense methods for excluding 404(b) 
evidence,119 emphasizes that the jury need not find proof of a certain 
element, which further diminishes the probative value of any 404(b) 
evidence.120 
 
 113. See id. (citing United States v. Wagoner, 713 F.2d 1371, 1376 (8th Cir. 1983), and 
Figueroa, 618 F.2d at 939).  The Fifth Circuit took a similar approach. See United States v. 
Silva, 580 F.2d 144, 148 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that there was no issue of intent when the 
defendant claimed mistaken identity and denied participating in the alleged crime and further 
stating that “if the act be proven the intent will usually be inferred”).  The First Circuit also 
considered the Figueroa approach, but did not officially adopt it because it was apparent that 
intent would be in dispute in the case in question. See United States v. Simon, 842 F.2d 552, 
555 (1st Cir. 1988). 
 114. 35 F.3d 1208, 1215 (7th Cir. 1994) (rejecting the defendant’s argument that the 
404(b) evidence was not relevant to any fact at issue at the time the evidence was offered as 
“unavailing because unlike the Second Circuit . . . this Circuit permits the government to 
present Rule 404(b) evidence in its case in chief if the crime requires proof of specific 
intent”).  The Seventh Circuit distinguishes between general intent crimes and specific intent 
crimes. See infra notes 299–305 and accompanying text. 
 115. See United States v. Liefer, 778 F.2d 1236, 1243 (7th Cir. 1985) (citing United 
States v. Weidman, 572 F.2d 102, 107 (7th Cir. 1978)). 
 116. See United States v. Jemal, 26 F.3d 1267, 1274 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 117. See id. 
 118. See DAVID P. LEONARD, THE NEW WIGMORE:  SELECTED RULES OF LIMITED 
ADMISSIBILITY § 1.11.5 n.58 (2002) (“When parties ‘stipulate’ to a fact, the trial 
judge . . . tell[s] the jury that ‘[I]f . . . you are firmly convinced that the defendant is guilty of 
the crime charged, you must find him guilty.’”); see also CLIFFORD C. FISHMAN, 3 JONES ON 
EVIDENCE § 17:99 (7th ed. 1998). 
 119. See supra Part I.B.1–2. 
 120. See Crowder I, 87 F.3d 1405, 1415 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc), vacated 519 U.S. 
1087 (1997), rev’d en banc 141 F.3d 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding that a stipulation 
coupled with a “must convict” jury instruction should result in the same outcome as 
admitting 404(b) evidence coupled with a limiting instruction; otherwise, “not only would 
the jury have to disregard a clear, simple instruction, but it also would have to acquit on a 
theory of the facts not advanced by either party and unsupported by any record evidence”); 
see also Sonenshein, supra note 55, at 248–49 (providing as a possible jury instruction, “if 
you the jury find that the defendant committed the charged act beyond a reasonable doubt, 
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For instance, in Crowder I, the D.C. Circuit, sitting en banc, adopted the 
Second Circuit’s view toward stipulations.121  There, the defendant, Horace 
Lee Davis, was convicted of intent to distribute crack cocaine.122  His 
defense theory was mistaken identity, arguing that he had nothing to do 
with the sale.123  Prior to trial, the government notified the defense that it 
intended to introduce three of Davis’s prior cocaine sales to prove 
knowledge and intent.124  Subsequently, the defense offered to stipulate to 
both of these elements, conceding “that the person who possessed the drugs 
both knew that they were drugs and intended to sell them.”125  On appeal, 
the D.C. Circuit held that the stipulation, coupled with a sufficient jury 
instruction, was enough to prevent the government from introducing any 
other evidence that the jury could use for impermissible propensity 
purposes.126 
In Figueroa, the Second Circuit considered the conditional type of 
stipulation at issue in Crowder I:  where the defendant claims no 
involvement in the crime but concedes that if the jury finds that the 
prosecution proves the identity as to the defendant, it must also find that the 
defendant had the requisite knowledge and intent.127  The court reasoned 
that the stipulation’s conditional nature can be confusing, but the risk can be 
minimized by a simple “must convict” jury instruction.128 
The Second Circuit similarly held in Mohel that once a concession is 
made by the defendant, the trial judge can instruct the jury that if it finds 
“beyond a reasonable doubt that all the other elements of the offense have 
been established a verdict of guilty may be returned.”129 
The First Circuit took a different approach in United States v. Garcia.130  
Recognizing the increasing frequency of 404(b) admissibility appeals, the 
court offered guidance on how to approach the issue.131  As it pertained to 
defense offers to stipulate, the court held that if the judge determined the 
proffered stipulation was sufficient, the judge should confirm that the 
defendant was aware of the implications his stipulation would have on the 
judge’s jury instruction before directing the jury to resolve the issue against 
the defendant.132  With regard to an uncontested element, rather than a 
 
you may infer from the act and all its surrounding circumstances that the defendant intended 
the natural and probable consequences of that act beyond a reasonable doubt” (quoting 
Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 514–15 (1979))). 
 121. See Crowder I, 87 F.3d at 1410 (“[W]e think the . . . Second . . . Circuit[’s] treatment 
of an offer to concede is most convincing.”). 
 122. See id. at 1408. 
 123. See id. 
 124. See id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. See id. at 1410. 
 127. See generally United States v. Figueroa, 618 F.2d 934 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 128. See id. at 942; cf. Crowder I, 87 F.3d at 1415 (suggesting that a “must convict” 
instruction is actually “clear” and “simple”). 
 129. United States v. Mohel, 604 F.2d 748, 754 (2d Cir. 1979). 
 130. 983 F.2d 1160 (1st Cir. 1993). 
 131. See id. at 1175. 
 132. Id. at 1175–76. 
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proffered stipulation, the court found this defense method inadequate to 
allow the judge to instruct the jury that the element need not be 
considered.133 
When a court does not accept these methods and allows 404(b) evidence 
at trial, the judge can—and, in many circuits, is required to—give a limiting 
instruction to the jury.134  When a trial judge is deciding whether to admit 
404(b) evidence, however, the judge is supposed to consider the effect that 
the limiting instruction might have on the jury.135  A majority of lower 
courts accept the notion that a limiting instruction effectively lessens the 
potential for 404(b) evidence to have a prejudicial effect.136  This remains 
the case even though the Court has recognized that limiting instructions 
may not work, especially when the evidence is likely to invoke high 
emotions in the jury.137 
Other courts, however, did not require a limiting instruction to be issued 
unless requested138 and also never entertained the idea that a “must convict” 
jury instruction could further devalue the probative worth of 404(b) 
evidence.  In United States v. Hadley139—and again in Breitkreutz140—the 
Ninth Circuit made clear that whether the defense elects not to contest an 
issue or unequivocally offers to stipulate to an issue does not matter; the 
prosecution may present its case the way it sees fit.141  Thus, coupling a 
 
 133. See id. at 1175 (“[D]efense counsel’s comments suggesting that the defendant would 
not argue an issue . . . were quite different from saying that the judge may instruct the jury 
that . . . the defense w[ould] not dispute the ‘knowledge’ or ‘intent’ needed to support the 
conviction.”). 
 134. See LEONARD, supra note 32, § 4.7 (finding that the Court’s ruling in Huddleston v. 
United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988), suggests that the general framework for admissibility of 
404(b) evidence should include a limiting instruction and, at the least, the Third, Fourth, and 
Tenth Circuits include one in their respective rules). 
 135. See FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee’s note (“In reaching a decision whether to 
exclude on grounds of unfair prejudice, consideration should be given to the probable 
effectiveness or lack of effectiveness of a limiting instruction.”); see also 22A CHARLES A. 
WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 5222 (2d ed. 
2014). 
 136. See LEONARD, supra note 118, § 1.11.5. But cf. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 135, 
§ 5222; Sonenshein, supra note 55, at 254 (“[S]ocial science has unequivocally 
demonstrated the utter futility of relying on limiting instructions to cure whatever error 
might occur in the admission of similar acts evidence.”). 
 137. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 17, § 4:13 n.25; see also Sonenshein, 
supra note 55, at 271 (explaining that the inefficiency of limiting instructions may derive 
from jurors’ failure to understand the instruction or that they comprehend the instruction but 
ignore it in favor of what they think is right); cf. Walton, supra note 35, at 1082 (“[E]ven 
when passions are low, not everyone can follow jury instructions.” (quoting Andrew K. 
Dolan, Rule 403:  The Prejudice Rule in Evidence, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 220, 249 (1976))). 
 138. See United States v. Sangrey, 586 F.2d 1312, 1315 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding that 
while a limiting instruction would have been preferred, the judge’s failure to issue one was 
reversible error because no instruction was requested by the defendant). 
 139. 918 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 503 U.S. 905 (1992), and dismissed as 
improvidently granted, 506 U.S. 19 (1992). 
 140. 8 F.3d 688 (9th Cir. 1993), abrogated by Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 
(1997); see supra Part I.B.1. 
 141. Hadley, 918 F.2d at 852 (“This burden is not relieved by a defendant’s promise to 
forgo argument on an issue. . . .  Hadley’s choice of defense did not relieve the government 
of its burden of proof . . . .”). 
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jury instruction with a proffered stipulation or uncontested issue did not 
suffice to exclude permissible 404(b) evidence during the Rule 403 
balancing test in the Ninth Circuit. 
Subsequently, the Supreme Court recognized the different approaches of 
the lower courts in admitting 404(b) evidence and granted certiorari in 
Hadley.142  Eight months later, however, the Court dismissed the case as 
improvidently granted without giving an explanation.143  With the dismissal 
of certiorari in Hadley, the lower courts continued to be divided over when 
to admit 404(b) evidence. 
C.  The Turning Point:  Old Chief v. United States 
In 1997, the Supreme Court revisited the subject, albeit in a much more 
limited manner.  Old Chief addressed the much narrower issue of how to 
treat defense offers to stipulate to the prior conviction “status” element in 
felon-in-possession cases.144  Prior to the decision, some circuits had ruled 
that a defense stipulation to a qualifying prior conviction prohibited 
evidence of the nature of the crime.145  Other circuits held that a prosecutor 
need not accept a defense offer to stipulate to the prior conviction, thus 
freeing the prosecutor to prove the nature of the defendant’s prior crime.146  
In Old Chief, the Court held that a prosecutor in a felon-in-possession case 
must accept a defense offer to stipulate to the status element.147 
Old Chief was convicted in the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Montana on, inter alia, felon in possession of a firearm charges.148  The 
federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), makes it unlawful for a person 
previously convicted of a felony to possess a firearm, punishable by 
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.149  At trial, Old Chief offered 
to stipulate to this element, effectively relieving the prosecution of the need 
 
 142. Hadley v. United States, 503 U.S. 905 (1992). 
 143. Hadley v. United States, 506 U.S. 19 (1992). 
 144. See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 172 (1997); see also Walton, supra 
note 35, at 1068–69.  The status element in felon-in-possession cases is important because 
the act charged would not be a crime if the defendant was not a convicted felon, as opposed 
to a case in which a prior felony conviction bears only on sentencing. See Risinger, supra 
note 2, at 425. 
 145. See United States v. Tavares, 21 F.3d 1, 3–4 (1st Cir. 1994) (en banc) (holding that 
forcing the prosecution to accept a stipulation to the status element in a felon-in-possession 
case in no way weakens the prosecution’s argument); United States v. Gilliam, 994 F.2d 97, 
103 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that in a felon-in-possession case, the jury need only know that 
there was a prior conviction, and the underlying facts of a prior conviction are irrelevant to a 
jury); see also United States v. Jones, 67 F.3d 320, 323–24 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (adopting the 
First Circuit’s holding in Tavares). 
 146. See United States v. Old Chief, No. 94–30277, 1995 WL 325745, at *1 (9th Cir. 
May 31, 1995), rev’d, 519 U.S. 172 (1997) (holding that “[r]egardless of the defendant’s 
offer to stipulate, the government is entitled to prove a prior felony offense through 
introduction of probative evidence”); see also United States v. Burkhart, 545 F.2d 14, 15 
(6th Cir. 1976); United States v. Smith, 520 F.2d 544, 548 (8th Cir. 1975).  Old Chief 
abrogated both Burkhart and Smith. 
 147. See Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 178. 
 148. See id. at 172. 
 149. See id. at 174; see also 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006). 
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to prove this element by admitting evidence of Old Chief’s prior 
convictions.150  The prosecutor refused to agree to the stipulation, asserting 
that he could prove his case in the way he saw fit.151 
On appeal, Old Chief argued that the district court abused its discretion 
when the trial judge allowed prejudicial evidence concerning Old Chief’s 
prior conviction.152  Old Chief was previously convicted of an assault 
causing serious bodily injury, and because his current case involved an 
altercation with a gun, allowing the use of Old Chief’s prior conviction 
could prejudice the jury.153  The Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s 
ruling, holding that “[r]egardless of the defendant’s offer to stipulate, the 
government is entitled to prove a prior felony offense through introduction 
of probative evidence.”154  After granting certiorari, the Supreme Court 
reversed.155 
1.  Majority Holding:  Relevancy and the Holistic Method 
The decision in Old Chief addressed whether a district court judge abuses 
her discretion by allowing the prosecution to reject a defendant’s offer to 
stipulate to the status element of a felon-in-possession charge.156  The issue 
is whether the danger that the jury will use the name and nature of the prior 
conviction for propensity purposes can ever be outweighed by its probative 
worth in these cases.157 
In an opinion by Justice Souter, the majority held that when a trial court 
does not accept a stipulation of this sort, it abuses its discretion.158  The 
Court divided its opinion into two tests of admissibility:  first, the evidence 
must pass through Rule 401; and second, the evidence must pass the Rule 
403 balancing test.159  When applying the Rule 403 balancing test, the court 
must consider the effect of offered stipulations against the prosecution’s 
need for narrative integrity and evidentiary richness.160 
To begin, the Court noted that Old Chief’s offer to stipulate did not make 
the prior conviction evidence irrelevant under Rule 401.161  Pointing to the 
advisory committee note to Rule 401, the Court held that evidence is not 
irrelevant just because it is not a disputed issue, but rather, if otherwise 
relevant evidence is to be excluded, it must be excluded under Rule 403.162  
 
 150. See Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 175. 
 151. See id. at 177. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 174–75; see also supra notes 9–12 and accompanying text. 
 154. Id. at 177 (quoting United States v. Old Chief, No. 94-30277, 1995 WL 325745 (9th 
Cir. May 31, 1995)). 
 155. See id. at 178. 
 156. Id. at 174. 
 157. See id.  While the issue in this case pertains narrowly to the element of a prior 
conviction, it has had a significant effect on stipulations to any element of a crime. See infra 
Part II. 
 158. See Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 174. 
 159. See id. at 178, 180. 
 160. See id. at 183; see also infra Part I.C.2. 
 161. See Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 179. 
 162. See id. 
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In other words, a defense stipulation that could serve to remove an issue 
from dispute does not make evidence any less relevant.163 
Then, the Old Chief majority addressed the more complicated matter of 
the Rule 403 balancing test.164  While noting that relevant evidence can be 
excluded if its probative value is outweighed by “unfair prejudice, 
confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or 
needlessly presenting cumulative evidence,”165 the Court focused on the 
danger of unfair prejudice.166  The danger is clear:  introducing evidence of 
a defendant’s prior bad act can cause a jury to equate that prior act with the 
defendant’s character.167  This might lure the jury into thinking the 
defendant is more likely to have committed the current crime because he 
committed the past one, or it might naturally prejudice the jury’s opinion, 
convincing it that the defendant should be convicted regardless of his 
guilt.168  It is precisely for this reason that Rule 404(a) exists.169 
Recognizing that courts use different approaches to Rule 403 balancing, 
the majority presented two possibilities:  first, “[a]n item of evidence might 
be viewed as an island,” with judges considering only that item’s probative 
value against its prejudicial risk; or second, “the question of admissibility 
might be seen as inviting further comparisons to take account of the full 
evidentiary context of the case.”170 
The Court readily adopted the second, more “holistic” approach in Old 
Chief, explaining that if there was an objection to the admissibility of an 
item of evidence, the trial judge should consider the probative value and 
unfair prejudice in light of any available substitutes for that evidence.171  If 
an available substitute has a lower danger of prejudice and the same 
probative value, then a proper exercise of judicial discretion seems to 
require a court to exclude 404(b) evidence under Rule 403.172  The Court 
qualified this substantial instruction to trial judges by pointing out the need 
to weigh the discounted value of the item of evidence against the need for 
“evidentiary richness and narrative integrity.”173 
 
 163. FED. R. EVID. 401 advisory committee’s note. 
 164. Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 180. 
 165. FED. R. EVID. 403. 
 166. Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 180. 
 167. See id. 
 168. See id. at 180–81. 
 169. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a) (stating the permissible and impermissible uses of character 
evidence); see also Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 181 (quoting Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 
469, 475–76 (1948)). 
 170. Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 182. 
 171. See id.; see also Kidd, supra note 46, at 257 (“Thus, a holistic approach to Rule 403 
concerning prior convictions should bar evidence of the name and nature of the offense since 
less prejudicial alternatives exist which reduce the probative value of the prior 
convictions.”). 
 172. Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 182–83. 
 173. See id. at 183. But cf. Thompson, supra note 47, at 71 (arguing that the Court should 
have ended its opinion at this point and that the subsequent paragraphs on narrative integrity 
and evidentiary richness were mere dictum, which, in effect, undermined the true holding). 
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a.  Evidentiary Richness and Narrative Integrity 
Responding to Justice O’Connor’s contention that there is a well-
accepted rule entitling the prosecution to prove its case in the manner in 
which it chooses,174 Justice Souter questioned whether Old Chief’s 
proffered stipulation carried the same evidentiary value as the evidence the 
government wanted to introduce.175  Does the Court’s holding allow the 
defendant to stipulate his way out of the case?176  What happens if the 
404(b) evidence addresses a number of different elements, increasing the 
force of that piece of evidence?177 
The Court conceded in its opinion that a singular piece of evidence could 
have great weight with a jury.178  The Court reasoned that a stipulation is 
abstract and may not be able to tell a “colorful story with descriptive 
richness” in the same manner as 404(b) evidence could.179  A stipulation, in 
other words, may be less effective in implicating “the law’s moral 
underpinnings and a juror’s obligation to sit in judgment.”180  Lastly, the 
Court addressed the ideas that a juror has expectations of what proper proof 
should look like and that the prosecution must be allowed to satisfy these 
demands,181 explaining that “[a] syllogism is not a story, and a naked 
proposition in a courtroom may be no match for the robust evidence that 
would be used to prove it.”182 
b.  The Narrow Holding 
The majority found that the name and nature of Old Chief’s prior 
conviction would be highly prejudicial and the district court should have 
considered Old Chief’s offer to stipulate to his prior conviction when 
 
 174. See Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 198 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 175. Id. at 186. 
 176. See id. 
 177. See id. at 187. 
 178. See id. (“When a juror’s duty does seem hard, the evidentiary account of what a 
defendant has thought and done can accomplish what no set of abstract statements ever 
could . . . .”). 
 179. See id. 
 180. See id. at 187–88 (“[T]he prosecution may fairly seek to place its evidence before 
the jurors . . . to convince [them] that a guilty verdict would be morally reasonable . . . .”). 
 181. Id. at 188 (suggesting that a juror might penalize the prosecution for not producing 
evidence that satisfies the jury’s expectations). 
 182. Id. at 189; cf. ROGER C. PARK, TRIAL OBJECTIONS HANDBOOK § 2:3 (2d ed. 2001) 
(reasoning that, if this principle is carried to its logical extreme, it would “revolutionize the 
law of relevancy”).  Park goes on to interpret the Court’s language as entitling the 
prosecution to admit evidence that is not needed for the jury to make logical inferences, but 
might be needed for the jury to establish “human significance” and adhere to its moral 
reasoning. See id. § 2:3; see also James Joseph Duane, “Screw Your Courage to the Sticking-
Place”:  The Roles of Evidence, Stipulations, and Jury Instructions in Criminal Verdicts, 49 
HASTINGS L.J. 463, 463–64 (1998) (citing Risinger, supra note 2, for the proposition that this 
portion of the Old Chief opinion, “a curious four-paragraph dollop of dictum buried in the 
middle of the majority opinion,” involved a marked departure from several points that the 
Court had long regarded as settled).  Duane surmises that this “four-paragraph disclaimer” 
was the price the majority paid in order to pick up the crucial fifth vote from Justice 
Kennedy. Id. at 464. 
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deciding to admit the evidence.183  Reversing the Ninth Circuit, the Court 
held that Old Chief’s offer to stipulate to the element amounted to an offer 
to admit to the prior conviction “and a defendant’s admission is, of course, 
good evidence.”184  The Court stressed that because the name and nature of 
the prior conviction was not pertinent to the current crime charged, allowing 
evidence of the prior conviction would not have further explained a part of 
the element that the stipulation would not otherwise cover.185  Logic, 
Justice Souter explained, would thus require the trial court to accept the 
stipulation when balancing under Rule 403.186 
Old Chief made clear that the prosecution has no need for evidentiary 
depth to tell a story with respect to Old Chief’s—or any defendant’s—legal 
status.187  The prior conviction element of the crime that is alleged does not 
treat different felonies differently, the prior conviction is not purportedly 
used to prove any other elements, and excluding the name and nature of the 
prior conviction does not leave any sort of gap in the prosecution’s story of 
the defendant’s crime.188  The Court thus held that under the Rule 403 
balancing test, the stipulation to the prior conviction and the evidence 
describing the name and nature of the prior conviction are distinguishable 
“only by the risk inherent in the one and wholly absent from the other.”189  
Therefore, it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to allow the 
404(b) evidence.190 
2.  The Old Chief Dissent 
In dissent, Justice O’Connor disagreed with both the holding of Old 
Chief, that the government must accept a defense stipulation to a prior 
conviction in a felon-in-possession case, and its reasoning, that revealing 
the name and nature of the defendant’s prior conviction is unfairly 
prejudicial to the defendant under Rule 403.191  In Justice O’Connor’s view, 
while evidence of this nature may harm the defendant, it is not “unfair” and 
thus not precluded by Rule 403.192 
 
 183. See Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 186. 
 184. Id. (citing FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A)). But see United States v. Old Chief, No. 94-
30277, 1995 WL 325745, at *1 (9th Cir. May 31, 1995), rev’d, 519 U.S. 172 (1997) (“Under 
Ninth Circuit law, a stipulation is not proof, and, thus, it has no place in the [Rule] 403 
balancing process.”).  While the Supreme Court reversed the holding of this case, it did not 
specifically reverse the Ninth Circuit’s rule that a stipulation is not sufficient proof in cases 
other than status. See infra Part II.B.2, II.C. 
 185. See Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 186. 
 186. See id. 
 187. See id. at 190. 
 188. See id. at 190–91 (“[P]roof of the defendant’s status goes to an element entirely 
outside the natural sequence of what the defendant is charged with thinking and doing to 
commit the current offense.”). 
 189. Id. at 191. 
 190. See id.; see also Kidd, supra note 46, at 258 (“The court abuses its discretion if it 
fails to exclude the full record when it is unnecessary, does not damage the prosecution’s 
burden of proof on the status element, and will lead to improper jury considerations.”). 
 191. Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 192–93 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 192. See id. at 193; see also FED. R. EVID. 403. 
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Justice O’Connor explained that the relevant statute envisioned the 
necessity for jurors to learn the name and nature of the crime because the 
accused must have previously committed a particular type of crime to 
satisfy the prior conviction element.193  The dissent argued that any harm 
that may result from introducing the name and nature of the prior 
conviction could be mitigated by a limiting instruction.194 
Finally, the dissent argued that the majority’s reasoning in concluding 
that the defense stipulation has the same probative value as the 
government’s evidence is inherently flawed.195  The dissent believed that a 
jury would be just as confused by the “missing chapter” of the defendant’s 
prior conviction as by a defense concession to any other element of the 
crime.196  Perhaps more importantly, Justice O’Connor asserted that even 
when a defendant attempts to stipulate or successfully stipulates to an 
element of the crime, it does not remove the government’s burden to prove 
each element of that crime beyond a reasonable doubt.197  Because the 
government has this burden, “it must be accorded substantial leeway to 
submit evidence of its choosing to prove its case.”198 
II.  OLD CHIEF’S AFTERMATH 
Justice Souter’s majority opinion concerning narrative integrity and 
evidentiary richness produced strong reactions and varied interpretations as 
to how those portions of the opinion applied to elements of a crime other 
than the status element.  It is indisputable, however, that Old Chief 
significantly clarified Rule 403, explicitly holding that the probative value 
of evidence must be determined by comparing alternative evidence.199  
While the advisory committee’s notes to Rule 403 suggest this, lower courts 
 
 193. See Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 194.  The crime must have been punishable by 
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, and particular crimes, such as business crimes, 
require a potential imprisonment of at least two years. See id.  Justice O’Connor reasoned 
that the Government was allowed to admit the specific gun that Old Chief possessed even 
though any firearm would satisfy the requirement and that this is no different than admitting 
the name and nature of the prior felony. See id. at 194–95. 
 194. See id. at 196. But see Walton, supra note 35, at 1082 (noting that Justice O’Connor 
failed to recognize the shortcomings of limiting instructions and that her argument “implies 
that they are a magical solution to a material problem . . . [that] fails to justify or to remedy 
the likelihood of unfair prejudice that will result from admitting evidence on the nature of a 
prior conviction”). 
 195. See Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 198 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 196. Id. 
 197. See id. at 199–200.  Justice O’Connor’s view is clearly inconsistent with the 
majority’s determination that a stipulation is the equivalent to an admission, which is, of 
course, “good evidence.” See id. at 186. 
 198. See id. at 200. But see Risinger, supra note 2, at 451–53 (“Justice O’Connor’s 
treatment of the defendant’s judicial admission as not formally binding seems disingenuous. 
. . .  Functionally, [refusing to permit a “must convict” jury instruction] is no more than 
saying that the right to a jury trial on every formal issue belongs to the government as well as 
the defense, and that the government may insist on it under all circumstances.”). 
 199. See Rule 403—Unfair Prejudice, 111 HARV. L. REV. 360, 365 (1997). 
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did not always heed that instruction, sometimes failing even to conduct a 
Rule 403 balancing test.200 
The previous part discussed the background of Old Chief and analyzed 
the Court’s opinion.  Part II of this Note focuses on the effects of that 
opinion and how the lower courts’ interpretations have changed in light of 
the Supreme Court’s holding.  Part II.A looks at the circuit courts that 
changed their approaches to admitting 404(b) evidence in light of Old 
Chief, some of which explicitly overruled precedent while others merely 
tweaked their tests.  Part II.B focuses on the circuits that did not alter their 
404(b) admissibility tests, either because or in spite of Old Chief’s 
discussion on narrative integrity and evidentiary richness.  This section 
looks at circuits on both sides of the 404(b) admissibility spectrum, with a 
focus on their application of the Rule 403 balancing test.  Finally, Part II.C 
analyzes the current trends of the Ninth Circuit in the wake of the Supreme 
Court’s reversal of its Old Chief decision. 
A.  Reversal Effect of Old Chief 
As seen in Part I, many circuits prior to Old Chief held that 404(b) 
evidence would not be allowed as proof of an element that was uncontested, 
whether the element was undisputed or the defense offered to stipulate to 
it.201  These circuits held that when an element was uncontested, a jury 
instruction would be sufficient to relieve the prosecution of its burden of 
proof on that element.202  Following Old Chief, however, some of these 
circuits understood Old Chief’s discussion on narrative integrity and 
evidentiary richness as overruling, either explicitly or implicitly, some of 
their prior holdings and 404(b) jurisprudence. 
1.  Crowder II:  The D.C. Circuit Is the First to Fall 
The D.C. Circuit was the first court to determine how Old Chief affected 
stipulations other than status.  As discussed in Part I, the D.C. Circuit found 
in Crowder I that a trial court abuses its discretion when it admits 404(b) 
evidence to prove an element of a crime if the defendant has offered to 
stipulate to that same element.203  The Supreme Court granted certiorari on 
Crowder I to review this holding but vacated and remanded the decision in 
light of the Court’s concurrent holding in Old Chief.204 
On remand, the D.C. Circuit considered the case again (Crowder II) and 
reversed, holding that “despite a defendant’s unequivocal offer to stipulate 
to an element of an offense, Rule 404(b) does not preclude the government 
 
 200. See id. (“The Court’s mandate that lower courts weigh the probative and prejudicial 
values of evidentiary alternatives along with the evidence in question should add structure to 
trial court decisionmaking and facilitate review of such decisions.”). 
 201. See supra Part I.B. 
 202. See supra Part I.B.3. 
 203. See United States v. Crowder (Crowder II), 141 F.3d 1202, 1203 (D.C. Cir. 1998) 
(en banc) (summarizing Crowder I). 
 204. See United States v. Crowder, 519 U.S. 1087, 1087 (1997). 
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from introducing evidence of other bad acts to prove that element.”205  The 
court reversed because it found its theory in Crowder I invalid in light of 
Old Chief.206  The Crowder I holding rested on the theory that the 
government does not need to prove knowledge and intent if the defendant 
concedes these elements and the concession is combined with an explicit 
jury instruction.207  The Crowder I court reasoned that the defendant’s 
proffered stipulation combined with the judge’s instruction to the jury 
eliminated the relevancy of the 404(b) evidence with respect to the 
knowledge and intent elements; without another “nonpropensity purpose, its 
only function would be to prove what Rule 404(b) barred.”208 
On remand from the Supreme Court, the D.C. Circuit found its reasoning 
in Crowder I to be flawed because it rested on the notion that the 404(b) 
evidence was no longer relevant.209  As the Court held in Old Chief that an 
issue need not be in dispute to be relevant and that alternative methods of 
proof do not bar evidence from being relevant, the D.C. Circuit considered 
its Crowder I theory overruled.210  The court reasoned that if the 404(b) 
evidence remains relevant and the government seeks to admit it for a 
nonpropensity purpose, then Rule 404(b) guarantees the government the 
right to seek its admission.211  If the trial court were then to exclude the 
evidence, it would have to be on a finding that the evidence is unfairly 
prejudicial in light of the proposed stipulation coupled with a jury 
instruction.212  Under this analysis, and in light of Old Chief’s notions of 
narrative integrity and evidentiary richness, the D.C. Circuit reversed its 
prior holding.213 
The Crowder II holding relied heavily on Old Chief’s discussion about 
stipulations, concluding that the Court’s objective was to distinguish the 
status element from other elements where a stipulation would not be 
satisfactory to the jury.214  Quoting Old Chief’s language on the importance 
of narratives,215 the D.C. Circuit was convinced that when it came to the 
elements of intent and knowledge, the probative value of the evidence of 
 
 205. Crowder II, 141 F.3d at 1203. 
 206. See id. at 1206. But see Thompson, supra note 47, at 73 (noting that Crowder II is 
“in no uncertain terms, a holding that runs counter to Old Chief’s actual holding and what 
FRE 404(b) requires”). 
 207. See Crowder II, 141 F.3d at 1205. 
 208. Id. 
 209. See id. at 1206. 
 210. See id.  The D.C. Circuit rested its holding in Crowder I on Rule 401, while the 
Supreme Court rested its holding in Old Chief on Rule 403, and for this reason, the D.C. 
Circuit re-evaluated its holding in light of the Court’s opinion. See id. 
 211. See id. But see id. at 1215 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (quoting the trial judge, then-Chief 
Judge Penn, in Crowder I:  “Let’s not kid ourselves, . . . the reason the government seeks to 
introduce [404(b) evidence] is because it’s prejudicial.” (citations omitted)). 
 212. See id. at 1206–07 (as opposed to a finding that the stipulation and jury instruction 
rendered the 404(b) evidence irrelevant). 
 213. See id. at 1207–09. 
 214. See id. at 1207. 
 215. See id. (arguing that “a syllogism is not a story” and the “evidentiary account of 
what a defendant has thought and done can accomplish what no abstract statements ever 
could” (quoting Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 187–89 (1997))). 
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Davis’s prior cocaine sales was not outweighed by its potential prejudicial 
effect.216  On the issue of whether Davis had the intent to distribute, the 
court reasoned that the evidentiary strength of stipulating to intent by 
concession (i.e., that whomever possessed the drugs in question possessed 
them with the intent to distribute) was not as good as evidence that Davis 
had previously possessed and sold cocaine.217 
In sum, the court held that the evidentiary richness of the 404(b) evidence 
added to the narrative integrity of the prosecution and tilted the Rule 403 
balance in favor of admission.218  As to Rule 403, the court held that (1) 
“each case will turn on the discretionary judgment of the trial court and its 
assessment, not of relevance, but of the evidentiary value of the 
government’s Rule 404(b) evidence,”219 and (2) the government also will 
have the effects of a limiting instruction to the jury to balance the scale 
further in its favor.220 
2.  The Crowder Effect 
The Crowder II majority believed that the force of evidence can affect its 
worth and that the way that proof is delivered to the jury affects its richness 
and value.221  Narrative integrity is about giving the prosecution the tools—
here, the evidence—it needs to convince the jury of the defendant’s guilt.222  
The jury, naturally, is interested in learning what happened.223  Some courts 
and commentators believe that jurors might punish the government if there 
seems to be a missing piece of evidence in the story, even if both parties 
 
 216. See id. at 1209–10. 
 217. See id. at 1208 (“Far from a choice between ‘propositions of slightly varying 
abstraction,’ the choice in these cases was between concrete evidence of the defendants’ 
actions giving rise to natural and sensible inferences, and abstract stipulations about 
hypothetical persons not on trial.”). But see id. at 1215 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (“The 
[majority] court worries that [because the stipulations did not reference the defendants by 
name,] a confused jury may decline to convict, but Crowder’s and Davis’s willingness to 
accept a ‘must convict’ jury instruction removes this danger. . . .  The offered instruction 
makes abundantly clear that possession, not knowledge or intent, remains the only issue in 
dispute.”). 
 218. See id. at 1210. 
 219. Id. 
 220. See id. But see MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, 3 HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 404:5 
(7th ed. 2012) (“The availability of a limiting instruction . . . while theoretically a factor in 
balancing, is of little practical significance since logic and experience indicate that the jury 
will be both uninterested in and incapable of considering the evidence solely for the purpose 
offered and not as evidence of the guilt of the defendant for the crime charged.” (citing 
United States v. Bradley, 390 F.3d 145, 155 (1st Cir. 2004))). 
 221. See Crowder II, 141 F.3d at 1210. 
 222. See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 187–88 (1997).  The Court’s 
discussion on the matter focused on appeasing the jury and providing them with a complete 
narrative. See id. 
 223. See Richard O. Lempert, Narrative Relevance, Imagined Juries, and a Supreme 
Court Inspired Agenda for Jury Research, 21 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 15, 17–18 (2002); 
see also Kidd, supra note 46, at 231 (suggesting that a voter on election night wants to know 
the story of the campaign trail more than the tally of the vote and analogizing that to the jury 
wanting to know the narrative of a crime rather than hearing a stipulation). 
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and the judge assure the juror that it is not needed.224  The Crowder II 
majority thus understood Old Chief to give a green light to evidence that 
can fill in these missing pieces.225 
Crowder II had a profound effect on the Eighth Circuit, which, prior to 
Old Chief, had adopted the Second Circuit’s rule that a defendant can avoid 
the prosecution’s 404(b) evidence if his defense is one of mistaken 
identity.226 
In the wake of Old Chief and Crowder II, the Eighth Circuit effectively 
held this line of cases overruled in United States v. Hill.227  Even conceding 
that the 404(b) evidence in question—a prior drug conviction—in Hill was 
“remote in time” from the acts charged,228 limiting its ability to assist the 
prosecution’s narrative, the court held the 404(b) evidence admissible to 
prove intent.229  The Hill court found the remote criminal acts of the 
defendant admissible because they could still be “a critical part of the story 
of [the] crime, and may be introduced to prove what the defendant was 
thinking or doing at the time of the offense.”230  Some argue, however, that 
prior bad acts, especially those remote in time, are by their nature separate 
 
 224. See Lempert, supra note 223, at 18 (“The jury is, not unreasonably, suspicious when 
evidence is provided in strange or unfamiliar ways, as by stipulations.”). But see Duane, 
supra note 182, at 465–66 (“The [Old Chief] Court cites no authority to support that 
proposition, and common sense squarely repudiates it.  No sane jury would ever draw an 
adverse inference against a party when the jury was given a sensible and uncontradicted [sic] 
explanation for the absence of proof on a point.” (footnotes omitted)).  Duane proceeded to 
explain that a jury accepts the prosecution’s “failure” to provide proof of an element when it 
is established, and when they are instructed that the trial judge denied the prosecution the 
opportunity to offer evidence on the point because the defense formally admitted to the court 
that the element was satisfied. See id. at 467. 
 225. Crowder II, 141 F.3d at 1208–09.  Others argue that this allows the story to be told 
“at great cost to the defendant.” See Thompson, supra note 47, at 72 (“The need for a story 
should never outweigh the highly prejudicial nature of prior bad acts.”).  Rather than 
determining the admissibility of evidence based on its ability to prove a historical fact that is 
disputed at trial, courts are determining admissibility based on “its capacity to influence 
jurors’ hearts as well as their minds.” See Duane, supra note 182, at 467–68 (interpreting 
Old Chief’s discussion about “moral reasonableness” as establishing a need for evidence that 
has the power to emotionally appeal to a jury and convince it to “reach an honest verdict” 
and suggesting that this was a “radical” idea “with virtually no supporting authority”). 
 226. See United States v. Hill, 249 F.3d 707, 710–11 (8th Cir. 2001).  Note that 
knowledge and intent are naturally undisputed in this type of defense, unlike a defense where 
the defendant claims to have innocently or mistakenly committed the act, in which 404(b) 
evidence would be appropriate. See id. (citing United States v. Colon, 880 F.2d 650, 657 (2d 
Cir. 1989)); supra notes 94–95 and accompanying text. 
 227. 249 F.3d 707 (8th Cir. 2001); see also, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 439 F.3d 947, 
952 (8th Cir. 2006). 
 228. Inter alia, possession with intent to distribute cocaine. See Hill, 249 F.3d at 709, 713. 
 229. See id. at 713 (“The evidence was relevant to show Hill’s intent, thus it passed Rule 
404(b)’s relevancy test.  Based upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Old Chief, this 
evidence also satisfied Rule 403’s balancing test.”). 
 230. Id. (quoting Crowder II, 141 F.3d 1202, 1207 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc)); see also 
United States v. Williams, 238 F.3d 871, 874 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that the district court 
denied the defendant’s motion offering to stipulate to knowledge and intent because it was 
easier for the jury to understand the concepts of knowledge and intent in this case if they 
focused on the facts prior to the search and recovery of the cocaine). 
2015] APPLYING OLD CHIEF TO RULE 403 307 
from the offense being tried and should not be integral to the story.231  By 
allowing the introduction of Hill’s previous drug conviction at trial, the 
court enabled the jury to make the inference—whether subconsciously or 
not—that Hill had the propensity to commit drug offenses.232 
The Eighth Circuit reaffirmed its post-Old Chief interpretation of Rule 
404(b) in United States v. Walker.233  Explaining that the line of cases 
arising out of United States v. Jenkins234 had been narrowed—if not 
overturned completely—by Old Chief’s affirmation that the government has 
the right to prove its case in the manner it sees fit, the Eighth Circuit held 
that even though the defendant did not “actively” dispute the elements of 
motive or intent, the Government was still permitted to offer evidence to 
prove these factors.235 
While other circuits are not quite as clear as to where on the 404(b) 
admissibility spectrum they fall post-Old Chief, other circuits have followed 
the D.C. and Eighth Circuits in broadening admissibility.  The Fifth Circuit, 
for example, held in United States v. Jackson236 that even when the 
defendant claims mistaken identity and does not dispute intent, intent will 
automatically be at issue in a specific intent crime.237  Meanwhile, the Sixth 
Circuit affirmed its prior holdings excluding 404(b) evidence, but, at the 
same time, opened the door for inclusion of this evidence when the 
underlying crime requires specific intent.238  These decisions demonstrate 
 
 231. Crowder II, 141 F.3d at 1214 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).  Past crimes 
“risk[] creating too many narrative connections between past and present,” and by allowing 
the prosecution to create these narratives, the court is authorizing the jury to make character 
inferences. Peter Brooks, Narrative Transactions—Does the Law Need a Narratology?, 18 
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 22 (2006).  It is precisely for this reason that narratives should not 
include 404(b) evidence of uncontested elements. See Sonenshein, supra note 55, at 216–17.  
Introducing evidence of prior similar acts at trial could produce the greatest prejudice 
“because it makes the propensity inference almost inescapable.” See id. at 217. 
 232. See Sonenshein, supra note 55, at 218.  The principle that a past drug conviction can 
be admitted to prove intent in the current drug prosecution is “fatally flawed; its application 
almost always violates Rule 404(b).  What chain of reasoning can link the prior drug 
history . . . to the charged crime other than one that infers that the defendant has a drug-
related propensity . . . ?  There is no propensity-free chain.” See id. (quoting Andrew J. 
Morris, Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b):  The Fictitious Ban on Character Reasoning from 
Other Crime Evidence, 17 REV. LITIG. 181, 191–92 (1998)). 
 233. 428 F.3d 1165 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 234. 345 F.3d 928 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 235. See Walker, 428 F.3d at 1169–70 (quoting Hill, 249 F.3d at 712); see also id. at 1170 
(“Hill’s attempt to remove intent as an issue in the case did not lift the Government’s burden 
of proving Hill’s intent.” (quoting Hill, 249 F.3d at 712)). 
 236. 339 F.3d 349 (5th Cir. 2003). 
 237. See id. at 355.  This holding is contrary to the Fifth Circuit’s view on the issue prior 
to Old Chief, see supra note 113, and was subsequently extended to include general intent 
crimes. See United States v. McCall, 553 F.3d 821, 828 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 238. Compare United States v. Bilderbeck, 163 F.3d 971, 977–78 (6th Cir. 1999) 
(holding that when a crime requires specific intent, the prosecution may use 404(b) evidence 
to prove it in light of Old Chief, despite a proffered stipulation by the defense), with Jenkins, 
345 F.3d at 939 (holding that the district court’s limiting instruction did not cure the 
prejudicial effect of letting in 404(b) evidence); see also infra notes 248–61 and 
accompanying text. But see United States v. Carter, 779 F.3d 623, 627 (6th Cir. 2015) 
(narrowing Bilderbeck and holding that “mere possession of a controlled substance is not 
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that courts do not have a clear understanding on how to interpret Old Chief.  
While some courts interpret Old Chief to overrule its jurisprudence, others, 
like the Sixth Circuit, briefly equivocated before reaffirming their 
precedents.239 
B.  Other Circuits Double Down on 404(b) Jurisprudence 
While some circuits shifted course after Old Chief, others stuck to their 
precedent.  This section first examines how the Sixth Circuit used Old 
Chief’s concepts of narrative integrity and evidentiary richness to continue 
excluding 404(b) evidence.240  Next, this section discusses the Second 
Circuit’s reaffirmation of its holdings in Figueroa, Mohel, and Colon, 
which prohibit 404(b) evidence if alternative evidence is available.241  
Finally, this section addresses how the Seventh Circuit interpreted Old 
Chief to reinforce its 404(b) admissibility jurisprudence, which is contrary 
to the Second Circuit’s stance on undisputed elements.242  Accordingly, this 
section demonstrates that the divergent views among the courts in Rule 
403/404(b) admissibility persist in the wake of Old Chief and, arguably, 
have been distended due to inconsistent interpretations of Old Chief. 
1.  The Second and Sixth Circuits Stick to Their Guns 
on 404(b) Evidence Admissibility 
Prior to Old Chief, some circuits excluded 404(b) evidence because it 
lacked probative value, reasoning that the government’s burden of proof 
was met on an element if that element was uncontested and a “must 
convict” jury instruction was read explaining this was the case.243  At the 
same time, these courts often found that even if the evidence had some 
probative value, it was outweighed by its potential for prejudice and no 
limiting instruction would suffice to cure the prejudice.244  Following Old 
Chief, some circuits reaffirmed that these reasons justified the exclusion of 
404(b) evidence, even when considering evidentiary richness and narrative 
integrity.245 
Simply put, these circuits hold that a limiting instruction is not an 
adequate safeguard to justify permitting evidence that is unnecessary to 
satisfy the prosecution’s burden of proof if that evidence could have a 
 
sufficiently similar to distribution to be probative of a specific intent to distribute controlled 
substances, even though both are obviously controlled-substance offenses”). 
 239. See infra Part II.B. 
 240. See infra notes 257–63 and accompanying text. 
 241. See infra notes 264–78 and accompanying text. 
 242. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 243. See United States v. Figueroa, 618 F.2d 934, 942 (2d Cir. 1980); see also Crowder I, 
87 F.3d 1405, 1410 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc), vacated 519 U.S. 1087 (1997), rev’d en banc 
141 F.3d 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1998); supra Part I.B. (discussing these cases within the broader 
Rule 404(b) context). 
 244. See Figueroa, 618 F.2d at 946 (“[L]imiting instructions cannot be regarded as a 
guaranty against prejudice.”). 
 245. The rest of this section discusses these cases and how the circuits’ interpretations 
differ from those discussed in Part II.A. 
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substantial prejudicial effect.246  This is so because, compared to “must 
convict” instructions, the effect of limiting instructions is much more 
uncertain.247 
For example, in United States v. Jenkins,248 the Sixth Circuit found that 
the district court’s limiting instruction was not a “sufficient remedy” for 
letting in 404(b) evidence.249  There, the defendant, Candy Jenkins, was 
charged with possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine after law 
enforcement officers found an unopened express mail package in her 
residence that contained a large amount of the drug.250  Her defense at trial 
was that she did not know that the package contained crack cocaine.251 
The district court allowed the government to introduce 404(b) evidence 
that Jenkins had previously smoked and was a current user of crack cocaine 
in order to prove that she knew what was in the package.252  The court gave 
a limiting instruction informing the jury that the evidence was only 
admissible “to the extent that [they] may determine [the testimony] might 
be relevant to the issue of knowledge.”253 
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit found that the district court abused its 
discretion in admitting this evidence.254  The circuit court held that the 
substantial prejudice caused by the admitted 404(b) evidence was not 
sufficiently limited by the jury instruction.255  “A limiting instruction will 
minimize to some degree the prejudicial nature of evidence of other 
criminal acts; it is not, however, a sure-fire panacea for the prejudice 
resulting from the needless admission of such evidence.”256 
In deciding Jenkins, the Sixth Circuit considered the narrative integrity 
and evidentiary richness concepts discussed in Old Chief.257  As mentioned 
above, the district court let in the 404(b) evidence to help the prosecution 
prove that Jenkins knew what was in the packages delivered to her 
apartment.258  On appeal, however, the Sixth Circuit held that her prior drug 
use did not help prove her knowledge of what was in the package.259  
Jenkins’s personal drug use, the court reasoned, did not add to the 
prosecution’s story that she was involved in the distribution of crack 
 
 246. See infra notes 248–56 and accompanying text. 
 247. See supra notes 135–37 and accompanying text.  As Judge Tatel explained in his 
Crowder II dissent, a limiting instruction requires the jury “to ignore the obvious implication 
of bad acts evidence, [while] a ‘must convict’ instruction would not require the jury to 
perform ‘mental gymnastics.’” See Crowder II, 141 F.3d 1202, 1215 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Tatel, 
J., dissenting) (quoting Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1932)). 
 248. 345 F.3d 928 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 249. See id. at 939. 
 250. Id. at 930–32. 
 251. See id. at 938. 
 252. See id. at 933. 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. at 939. 
 255. See id. 
 256. Id. (quoting United States v. Haywood, 280 F.3d 715, 724 (6th Cir. 2002) (citations 
omitted)). 
 257. See id. at 937–39. 
 258. See id. at 933. 
 259. See id. at 937. 
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cocaine;260 rather, if it added anything at all to the prosecution’s narrative, it 
was probative of her character.261  Finding that there was no permissible 
404(b) purpose for the admission of the evidence, the court additionally 
ruled that the 404(b) evidence also did not meet the requirements of Rule 
403.262  The court found that the danger of unfair prejudice substantially 
outweighed the probative value of the evidence and that the limiting 
instruction was insufficient to remedy this danger.263 
The Second Circuit similarly found that Old Chief did not overrule its 
Rule 404(b) jurisprudence.  Numerous Second Circuit decisions still cite 
Mohel and Figueroa as good law,264 and the recent United States v. 
Basciano265 decision demonstrates how the court factors Old Chief into its 
404(b) admissibility decisions without overturning prior cases.266  In 
Basciano, the Government sought to introduce multiple pieces of 404(b) 
evidence—all involving Basciano’s alleged involvement in other violent 
crimes—in order to prove Basciano’s motive for the charged crimes.267  
Basciano’s counsel offered to stipulate to the existence of the Bonanno 
crime family, its involvement in racketeering activity, and Basciano’s own 
rank and position within the family at the time of his arrest.268  In light of 
these concessions, the district court first determined the admissibility of the 
404(b) evidence under Rule 404.269  Having found this requirement 
satisfied, the court then turned to Rule 403, in line with both its own 
jurisprudence and the method endorsed by the Old Chief majority.270 
Quoting Old Chief throughout its analysis, the court evaluated the 
probative value of the 404(b) evidence, factoring in any available 
substitutes, including the stipulations by the defense.271  The court found it 
within its discretion to exclude the government’s 404(b) evidence if using a 
stipulation lowered the risk for prejudice and had the same probative value, 
as “what counts as the Rule 403 ‘probative value’ of an item of evidence, as 
 
 260. See id. at 938. 
 261. See id. 
 262. See id. at 938–39.  Having already answered the Rule 404(b) question, the court had 
no need to answer the Rule 403 question.  Nevertheless, the court proceeded to conduct the 
analysis under Rule 403, perhaps in an attempt to clarify the court’s jurisprudence in the 
wake of Old Chief. See id. 
 263. See id. at 939. 
 264. See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 677 F.3d 72, 82 (2d Cir. 2012); see also United 
States v. Massino, 546 F.3d 123, 132–33 (2d Cir. 2008); United States v. Sampson, 385 F.3d 
183, 193 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 265. No. 05-CR-060 (NGG), 2011 WL 114867 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2011), rev’d on 
reconsideration, 2011 WL 477281 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2011). 
 266. The Basciano case has a convoluted procedural history.  For more factual detail and 
reasoning, see United States v. Basciano, No. 03-CR-929 (NGG), 2006 WL 385325 
(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2006). 
 267. Basciano, 2011 WL 114867, at *2. 
 268. See id. at *5. 
 269. See id. at *2–3. 
 270. See id. at *3–4 (citing Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180 (1997); United 
States v. Figueroa, 618 F.2d 934, 943 (2d Cir. 1980)). 
 271. See id. at *4 (citing Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 182). 
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distinct from its Rule 401 ‘relevance,’ may be calculated by comparing 
evidentiary alternatives.”272 
The court then noted that Old Chief requires weighing the evidentiary 
alternatives against the government’s “need” for evidentiary richness and 
narrative integrity.273  The court also noted that even if two pieces of 
evidence prove the same point, that does not mean that only one of them is 
permissible.274  Furthermore, the court observed that a defendant cannot use 
stipulations in order to deprive the government of evidentiary richness.275 
Accordingly, the court considered the defendant’s concessions to be 
“unequivocal” and took them into careful consideration when balancing the 
probative value of the government’s proposed 404(b) evidence against its 
potential prejudicial effect.276  The court subsequently held that some of the 
government’s 404(b) evidence would be admissible where the court 
believed its worth outweighed its prejudice, while other evidence was 
inadmissible where alternative evidence was more prejudicial but similarly 
probative even in light of the prosecution’s need for evidentiary richness.277 
Basciano demonstrates that after Old Chief, the Second Circuit still 
adheres to the approach set forth in Figueroa.  The court has held that if an 
element is undisputed, then 404(b) evidence is not allowed, despite Old 
Chief’s discussion on narrative integrity and evidentiary richness.278 
2.  A Narrow Reading of Old Chief Reinforces 
404(b) Evidence Admissibility 
The Seventh Circuit still strongly believes that due to the burden of 
proof, prosecutors should be allowed to admit 404(b) evidence as long as it 
is used for a permissible purpose—even if it addresses an element not in 
dispute.  The court, which held prior to Old Chief that the prosecution is 
always entitled to prove its case in the way it sees fit,279 determined that 
Old Chief confirmed its approach.280  In spite of Old Chief’s holding that a 
stipulation must be accepted as proof of status, the Seventh Circuit used the 
majority’s discussion of narrative integrity and evidentiary richness to 
reaffirm that the prosecution “is entitled to prove its case free from any 
defendant’s option to stipulate the evidence away” in situations involving 
elements other than status.281 
 
 272. Id. (quoting Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 182–84). 
 273. See id. (quoting Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 183). 
 274. See id.  One could argue that that is exactly what Rule 403 prohibits. See FED. R. 
EVID. 403 (“The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by a danger of . . . needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”). 
 275. Basciano, 2011 WL 114867, at *4. 
 276. See id. at *5. 
 277. See id. 
 278. See id.; see also supra note 264 and Part I.B.1–2. 
 279. See supra notes 89–92 and accompanying text (given that proper limiting 
instructions would be read to the jury to combat any prejudicial effect of 404(b) evidence). 
 280. See United States v. Williams, 238 F.3d 871, 875–76 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 281. See id. at 875 (quoting Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 189 (1997)). 
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In so concluding, the Seventh Circuit interpreted Old Chief’s holding 
narrowly.282  The court had held in United States v. Connor283 that neither 
stipulations nor the lack of dispute on an issue could relieve the prosecution 
from its burden in circumstances other than those present in Old Chief.  “To 
hold otherwise would be to tie the hands of the government in meeting its 
burden of proof where no defense was presented on an element . . . .”284 
Connor relied on United States v. Williams,285 an earlier opinion holding 
that a defendant’s ability to stipulate would “render prosecutors unable to 
meet the jury’s expectations of proof” because it would break the “natural 
sequence of narrative evidence.”286  Here, the court followed the D.C. 
Circuit’s lead in Crowder II.  Reginald Williams was charged with 
possession with intent to distribute cocaine.287  The court allowed the 
testimony of John Peeler, in which he said that he had often purchased 
drugs from Williams in the past, in order to demonstrate “motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge and absence of mistake or 
accident.”288  As in Crowder II, the defendant offered to stipulate to the 
elements of intent and knowledge by conceding that whoever possessed the 
drugs in question had the necessary intent, leaving physical possession of 
the drugs as the only issue.289 
Relying on Crowder II and Old Chief, the Seventh Circuit held that this 
type of stipulation is abstract and “simply does not contain the same or 
similar evidentiary force as a showing that Mr. Williams himself had such 
intent and knowledge.”290  The court held this completely distinguishable 
 
 282. See United States v. Bowling, 770 F.3d 1168, 1176 (7th Cir. 2014) (distinguishing 
the facts in this case “from those in Old Chief, which the Supreme Court deliberately limited 
to cases involving proof of felon status” (citing United States v. Phillippi, 442 F.3d 1061, 
1064 (7th Cir. 2006))). But see Sonenshein, supra note 55, at 249 (pointing out that nowhere 
in Old Chief did the Supreme Court hold that courts could not balance the need for 404(b) 
evidence against its potential prejudice in situations other than felon status). 
 283. 583 F.3d 1011, 1022–23 (7th Cir. 2009).  The court does not mention Old Chief in 
its Rule 404(b) reasoning because the court considers Old Chief to be limited to its facts. See 
supra note 282. 
 284. Connor, 583 F.3d at 1023.  Is this holding justified if the introduction of evidence is 
just a means to an end? See Walton, supra note 35, at 1087.  “The only legitimate purpose 
for introducing evidence is to prove the ultimate . . . propositions disputed between the 
parties.” See id. (citations omitted).  As Old Chief held, a defendant’s unequivocal 
stipulation “is, of course, good evidence.” Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 186 
(1997); see also Crowder I, 87 F.3d 1405, 1422–23 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc), vacated 519 
U.S. 1087 (1997), rev’d en banc 141 F.3d 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“While a defendant’s 
concession or offer to stipulate is not ‘proof,’ it may serve the same function, and the trial 
judge should factor it into the 403 balance.”). 
 285. 238 F.3d 871, 875–76 (7th Cir. 2001) (citing Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 188–89 (1997)). 
 286. See id. at 876 (quoting Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 188–89).  In Williams, the defense was 
that the drugs did not belong to the defendant—essentially arguing a case of mistaken 
identity. See id. at 873–74.  In Connor, however, the defense counsel indicated that the 
defendant was at the scene, but was merely an innocent bystander. See Connor, 583 F.3d at 
1022. 
 287. See Williams, 238 F.3d at 873. 
 288. See id. 
 289. See id. at 876. 
 290. Id. 
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from the status issue in Old Chief.291  Here, the court did not find the 
richness of the stipulation to be the same as that of the evidence itself and, 
thus, even a “must convict” jury instruction would not have the same effect 
on the jury as would the 404(b) evidence the prosecution sought to 
admit.292 
The Seventh Circuit’s ruling also emphasized that the trial judge gave a 
limiting instruction to the jury.293  Before Peeler’s testimony, the district 
court told the jury that they should consider only the testimony “on the 
question of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity and absence of mistake or accident.”294  The Seventh Circuit agreed 
that the district court properly admitted the evidence and held that the 
limiting instruction properly cautioned the jury to consider the testimony 
for only those purposes—“a procedural safeguard that [the court has] often 
found to minimize the prejudicial effect of [404(b)] evidence.”295 
More recently, in United States v. Gomez,296 the Seventh Circuit found a 
limiting instruction sufficient to counteract the admission of 404(b) 
evidence.297  The court went to great lengths to establish what a good jury 
instruction would look like.298  The court also made several findings 
necessary to its main point.  First, the court explained its prior decisions 
concerning specific intent crimes versus general intent crimes and held that 
in crimes of specific intent,299 the element of intent is automatically at 
issue.300  Meanwhile, in crimes of general intent, the defendant’s intent can 
be inferred from the act itself, and the defendant must put the element at 
issue before 404(b) evidence can be admitted to prove the element.301  
Second, the court held that even in specific intent crimes, “automatically at 
issue” does not mean “automatically admissible.”302  Finally, the court 
clarified its opinion from another recent case303 that there is no general rule 
 
 291. See id. 
 292. See id. 
 293. Id. 
 294. Id. at 874. 
 295. Id. at 876. 
 296. 763 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 297. Id. at 860–61. 
 298. See id.  The court found that a sufficient limiting instruction should explain to the 
jurors that they must not use the 404(b) evidence to make character inferences and find that 
the defendant has acted “in character” by allegedly committing the crime charged. See id.  
This is so because “it does not follow from the defendant’s past acts that he committed” the 
present act. Id.  Furthermore, the court noted that this type of inference is not permitted 
because the prosecution has the burden of proof and “it cannot discharge its burden by 
inviting an inference that the defendant is a person whose past acts suggest a willingness or 
propensity to commit crimes.” Id. 
 299. Possession with intent to distribute, for example, is a specific intent crime. See id. at 
858. 
 300. See id. 
 301. See id.; see also supra note 257 (noting that the Sixth Circuit also makes this 
distinction with specific intent crimes and more readily permits 404(b) evidence in these 
cases). 
 302. See Gomez, 763 F.3d at 859 (holding that 404(b) evidence must still be relevant and 
more probative than prejudicial to be admissible). 
 303. See United States v. Richards, 719 F.3d 746, 759 (7th Cir. 2013). 
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that excludes 404(b) evidence if the defendant does not “‘meaningfully 
dispute’ the non-propensity issue for which the evidence is offered.”304  The 
court qualified this holding by noting that the district court should consider 
the degree to which the issue is actually contested in making its Rule 403 
ruling.305  In other words, the Seventh Circuit distinguishes between 
specific intent and general intent crimes in order to establish different 
methods for when to permit 404(b) evidence.306 
The court went a step further in United States v. Reed.307  There, the 
court excluded 404(b) evidence that it found to be used solely for 
propensity purposes.308  The court held that “[p]attern evidence is 
propensity evidence,” and it may not be admissible unless the pattern 
proves or suggests a fact at issue.309 
In summary, the Seventh Circuit still permits 404(b) evidence in many 
cases where its sister circuits do not,310 but it has recently started to 
question whether evidence that is purported to be used for a proper purpose 
is actually being used for the sake of demonstrating propensity.311  
Additionally, Gomez established that the court abides by the maxim that the 
prosecution is entitled to prove its case as it sees fit and an issue need not be 
disputed in order for the government to offer 404(b) evidence to prove it.312 
The Fourth Circuit is similar to the Seventh Circuit in several respects.  
First, it also interpreted Old Chief narrowly.313  Second, the court made the 
same distinction with specific intent crimes.314 
In United States v. Queen,315 the Fourth Circuit laid out its test for 
determining 404(b) admissibility.316  In addition to requiring that evidence 
 
 304. See Gomez, 763 F.3d at 859. 
 305. See id. at 860. 
 306. See id.  This Note deals mostly with cases involving specific intent crimes, which the 
courts have found to be the most permissive when it comes to allowing 404(b) evidence. See 
supra Parts I.B, II. See generally Sonenshein, supra note 55 (dissecting Old Chief as it 
applies to intent crimes). 
 307. 744 F.3d 519 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 308. See id. at 525. 
 309. Id. (quoting United States v. Miller, 673 F.3d 688, 699 (7th Cir. 2012)). 
 310. Compare United States v. Connor, 583 F.3d 1011, 1026 (7th Cir. 2009) (admitting 
404(b) evidence in spite of a defense offer to stipulate), with United States v. Scott, 677 F.3d 
72, 84–85 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that an offer to stipulate is alternative evidence that affects 
the probative worth of potential 404(b) evidence). 
 311. See supra note 309 and accompanying text; see also Connor, 583 F.3d at 1025–26 
(holding that a stipulation to an element cannot relieve the prosecution of its burden and does 
not factor the availability of alternative evidence into its Rule 403 balancing test). 
 312. See United States v. Gomez, 763 F.3d 845, 859 (7th Cir. 2014).  The court did 
however point out that as 404(b) evidence is almost always prejudicial, the trial judge must 
be sensitive to the real factual disputes in the case when conducting the Rule 403 balancing 
test. See id. at 860. 
 313. See United States v. Grimmond, 137 F.3d 823, 833 n.14 (4th Cir. 1998) (“We 
believe that the Supreme Court intended its decision in Old Chief to be limited to stipulations 
involving a defendant’s status as a convicted felon.  Otherwise, the Court, without 
explanation, reversed a longstanding series of cases.”). 
 314. See United States v. Hernandez, 975 F.2d 1035, 1040 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding that 
unlike the Second Circuit, the Fourth Circuit has no precept that 404(b) evidence is 
inadmissible when the defendant unequivocally denies committing the crime and uses the 
defense of mistaken identity). 
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be relevant, necessary, and reliable to find a permissible 404(b) purpose, the 
court emphasized that the evidence must also pass the Rule 403 balancing 
test.317  The court further held that if a limiting instruction is requested, the 
judge must issue one to safeguard “against the pitfalls the rule protects 
against.”318  The Fourth Circuit reasoned that if admissibility of 404(b) 
evidence were determined according to these rules, then it would not be 
used to convict a defendant for his prior acts or on the basis of his 
character.319 
The Fourth Circuit distinguished itself from the Seventh Circuit, 
however, in United States v. McBride,320 when it overturned a trial court 
and excluded the 404(b) evidence in question.321  In response to the 
government’s argument that the 404(b) evidence was necessary for the 
government to satisfy its burden of proof, the Fourth Circuit held that 
“[w]hile this statement of the law is accurate, it does not provide a general 
license for the use of essentially unrelated prior ‘bad act’ evidence.”322 
The Seventh Circuit interprets Old Chief narrowly by its facts, but, at the 
same time, uses Old Chief’s discussion of narrative integrity and 
evidentiary richness.323  This allows the court to leverage Old Chief’s 
discussion on narrative integrity and evidentiary richness, but distinguish 
any case that does not involve felon-in-possession crimes from the holding 
that a stipulation must be accepted as alternative evidence to prove an 
element.324  The Fourth Circuit, however, interprets Old Chief narrowly, but 
does not use the narrative integrity and evidentiary richness discussion to 
allow in evidence that it otherwise would prohibit.325  What is still unclear 
is if Old Chief requires alternative evidence to be factored into a court’s 
Rule 403 balancing test in situations outside the facts of Old Chief.  The 
answer for the Seventh Circuit at least appears to be “no.”326 
C.  Where Does the Ninth Circuit Stand? 
Before concluding this part of the Note, it is important to analyze how 
the Ninth Circuit has treated 404(b) admissibility after its decision was 
overturned in Old Chief.  Conducting this analysis, however, is difficult due 
to the lack of relevant cases.  In one of the few post-Old Chief cases 
 
 315. 132 F.3d 991 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 316. Id. at 997. 
 317. See id. (“[T]he evidence’s probative value must not be substantially outweighed by 
confusion or unfair prejudice in the sense that it tends to subordinate reason to emotion in the 
factfinding process.”). 
 318. Id. 
 319. See id. 
 320. 676 F.3d 385 (4th Cir. 2012) (holding that the evidence did not pass the Queen 
admissibility test). 
 321. Id. at 398. 
 322. Id. 
 323. See supra notes 285–95 and accompanying text. See generally United States v. 
Williams, 238 F.3d 871 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 324. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 325. See McBride, 676 F.3d at 398. 
 326. See supra notes 310–11 and accompanying text. 
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discussing 404(b) evidence admissibility within the Rule 403 context, 
United States v. Merino-Balderrama,327 the Ninth Circuit seemed to accept 
Old Chief’s holding that a stipulation must be considered alternative 
evidence and must be factored into the Rule 403 balancing test.328 
In Merino-Balderrama, the court conceded that the defendant’s offer to 
stipulate to two of three elements of the crime “added to the pool of 
available evidentiary alternatives.”329  Furthermore, in stark contrast to its 
Breitkreutz330 holding prior to Old Chief, here the court held that Merino-
Balderrama’s proffered stipulation “would have been conclusive on those 
two elements” and could have required the district court to exclude the 
404(b) evidence the government wanted to use to prove those elements.331 
This decision demonstrates that in light of the Old Chief opinion, the 
Ninth Circuit, while still inclusive of 404(b) evidence in some respects, no 
longer relies on its Breitkreutz reasoning that a stipulation is not proof and 
should not be considered alternative evidence.332 
It turns out that while the Supreme Court may have resolved the narrow 
issue of defense stipulations to status elements of crimes in Old Chief, it 
opened the door to widening the disparity in all other 404(b) admissibility 
cases.  Lower courts continue to struggle with two key unanswered 
questions:  First, how should the availability of alternative evidence or lack 
of dispute on an issue affect the Rule 403 balancing process in deciding the 
admissibility of 404(b) evidence?  Second, how should the availability of 
“must convict” and limiting instructions affect this analysis? 
III.  REENVISIONING THE RULES FOR ADMISSION OF 404(B) EVIDENCE 
AND RULE 403 BALANCING 
This Note has demonstrated that Rule 403 jurisprudence concerning 
404(b) admissibility is inconsistent among the circuits.  There is not a 
definitive “circuit split,” but more of a spectrum:  at one end, 404(b) 
evidence is admitted, and at the other, it is excluded.  Part III of this Note 
provides a guide for courts to use in deciding whether to admit 404(b) 
evidence and when to accept a proffered stipulation from the defense. 
Part III.A of this Note proposes a comprehensive understanding of Old 
Chief and its effects and applicability to 404(b) evidence admissibility.  
This part examines both the holdings in the cases discussed above and 
scholarly opinions to explain which interpretations are most true to Old 
Chief’s teachings.  Next, Part III.B suggests a unifying approach to 404(b) 
 
 327. 146 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 328. See id. at 762. 
 329. Id. 
 330. See supra notes 89–92 and accompanying text. 
 331. Marino-Balderrama, 146 F.3d at 762 (holding that a proffered stipulation is “not 
merely relevant but seemingly conclusive evidence of the element” (quoting Old Chief v. 
United States, 519 U.S. 172, 186 (1997))). 
 332. This differs from the Seventh Circuit, which reaffirmed after Old Chief that a 
stipulation is too abstract in most circumstances and does not provide the evidentiary 
richness to which the government is entitled. See supra notes 283–84 and accompanying 
text. 
2015] APPLYING OLD CHIEF TO RULE 403 317 
admissibility.  In doing so, this part focuses on when the prosecution and 
court should accept a defense stipulation to an element.  Finally, this part 
addresses how limiting instructions should factor into a trial judge’s 
decision. 
A.  How Courts Should Interpret and Apply Old Chief 
While Old Chief has certainly been an important decision in 404(b) 
admissibility jurisprudence, it has left too much room for interpretation.  In 
response, courts and commentators have interpreted it in the way they see 
fit.  Perhaps the Old Chief ruling could have been more clearly articulated.  
The more likely case, however, is that courts have chosen to interpret Old 
Chief through the lens required to achieve the results they desire.333 
The main holding of Old Chief is not disputed:  the government must 
accept a defense offer to stipulate to the status element of a felon-in-
possession charge.334  When one combines alternative evidence in the form 
of a stipulation that the government can use to prove the status element with 
the finding that the 404(b) evidence (i.e., the name and nature of Old 
Chief’s prior conviction) does not add to the prosecution’s need for 
evidentiary richness to tell a compelling narrative, it reduces the probative 
value of the 404(b) evidence to the point that it is outweighed by its unfairly 
prejudicial effect.335  Both of these conditions are essential to Old Chief and 
support the proposition that the discussion on narrative integrity and 
evidentiary richness is not “mere dicta.”336  The Court noted that the 
general nature of Old Chief’s prior conviction is so outside the natural 
narrative of what the prosecution needs to tell the jury that the stipulation 
should suffice just as well.337 
Beyond this narrow holding, Old Chief left the door open for 
interpretations that run counter to the Court’s jurisprudence.  First, while 
the “four-paragraph dollop”338 on evidentiary richness and narrative 
 
 333. See Thompson, supra note 47, at 72–76. 
 334. Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 191. 
 335. See id. at 190.  But some commentators feel that the narrative integrity and 
evidentiary richness discussion was unnecessary to the majority’s holding. See supra note 
173. 
 336. See Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 191 (holding that the presumption that the prosecution 
may choose its evidence is not applicable here because “proof of the defendant’s status goes 
to an element entirely outside the natural sequence of what the defendant is charged with 
thinking and doing to commit the current offense”); see also supra notes 257–63 and 
accompanying text (showing how the Sixth Circuit excluded 404(b) evidence because it did 
not add to the narrative integrity of the prosecution’s case). But see supra notes 285–92 and 
accompanying text (showing how the Seventh Circuit permits 404(b) evidence because 
exclusion—and acceptance of a stipulation—would break the natural sequence of the 
narrative). 
 337. See Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 190 (“Nor can it be argued that the events behind the 
prior conviction are proper nourishment for the jurors’ sense of obligation to vindicate the 
public interest. . . .  Congress, however, has made it plain that . . . the qualifying conviction 
is alone what matters under the statute.  ‘A defendant falls within the category simply by 
virtue of past conviction for any [qualifying] crime . . . .’” (alteration in original) (citing 
United States v. Tavares, 21 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1994))). 
 338. See Duane, supra note 182, at 463. 
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integrity is indispensable to the Court’s holding, it seems to go astray when 
Justice Souter reasons that 404(b) evidence may be necessary to “implicate 
the law’s moral underpinnings and a juror’s obligation to sit in 
judgment.”339  This suggests that 404(b) evidence is allowed, and, in fact, 
its admissibility is determined by its ability to help persuade the jury to use 
its moral, not logical, judgment in deciding the outcome of the case.340  
Surely, the majority did not intend for Old Chief to radically alter one of the 
fundamental principles of the U.S. judicial system—that the jury must 
judge a man based on the factual evidence of the particular crime at issue 
and not on moral evidence of his character.341  In fact, interpreting Old 
Chief in that way contradicts the rest of the opinion itself.342 
Understanding that Old Chief could not have intended this consequence, 
it is possible to see how the remainder of the discussion on narrative 
integrity and evidentiary richness reinforces the majority’s holding.  Even 
once the Court factored in the prosecution’s “need” for narrative integrity 
and evidentiary richness, the 404(b) evidence in Old Chief’s case still did 
not carry enough probative worth to counteract the availability of 
alternative proof.343 
Second, the Court expressed a rule specific to the status element, which 
essentially nullifies the need to conduct a Rule 403 balancing test in these 
situations.344  In cases dealing with elements other than status, the Court 
predicted that the prosecutor’s choice to introduce 404(b) evidence would 
generally survive a Rule 403 analysis even when a defendant seeks to 
stipulate to the element the evidence is meant to prove.345  But, the Court 
also held that stipulations must be factored into the Rule 403 analysis, and, 
more importantly, the Court did not limit this holding to status-only 
cases.346  Accordingly, any court that dismisses the fact that an issue is not 
disputed or that the defense has offered to stipulate to it without factoring it 
 
 339. See Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 188; see also Duane, supra note 182, at 474. 
 340. See Duane, supra note 182, at 467. 
 341. See id. at 468 (“Incredibly, this breathtakingly radical vision of the trial process was 
asserted with virtually no supporting authority.”); see also supra notes 19, 182 and 
accompanying text. 
 342. See Brooks, supra note 231, at 22 (“The story of the past crime must be excluded, 
not because it is irrelevant, but because it may appear over-relevant:  ‘it is said to weigh too 
much with the jury and to so overpersuade them as to prejudge one with a bad general record 
and deny him a fair opportunity to defend against a particular charge.’” (quoting Old Chief, 
519 U.S. at 181)). 
 343. See Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 183, 191.  Likewise, the Second Circuit understood that 
this holding could apply beyond the status element. See supra notes 266–77 and 
accompanying text (analyzing the court’s holding in Basciano, No. 05-CR-060 (NGG), 2011 
WL 114867, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2011), rev’d on reconsideration, 2011 WL 477281, at 
*4 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2011)). 
 344. See Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 191–92. 
 345. See id. at 192. 
 346. See id. at 184–85 (holding that the Rule 404 advisory committee’s notes “leave no 
question” that a Rule 403 analysis requires not only weighing the evidence’s probative value 
with its unfair prejudice, “but by placing the result of that assessment alongside similar 
assessments of evidentiary alternatives”); see also FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee’s 
note. 
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into its Rule 403 balancing test is in error.347  Even if a court limits Old 
Chief to the facts of the case, the advisory committee’s note to Rule 404 
requires it.348 
Third, Old Chief should not be interpreted to broaden the scope of 404(b) 
admissibility.  For instance, the D.C. and Eighth Circuits interpreted Old 
Chief to overturn their line of cases on 404(b) admissibility under Rule 
403.349  In Hill, the Eighth Circuit cited the D.C. Circuit’s reasoning in 
Crowder II to hold 404(b) evidence admissible even though the defense 
offered to stipulate intent, and the evidence was completely remote in time 
from the current charge.350  The court held that Old Chief “eliminates the 
possibility that a defendant can escape the introduction of past crimes under 
Rule 404(b) by stipulating to the element of the crime at issue.”351  
Nowhere in Old Chief does it say this; rather, the Eighth Circuit simply 
quotes a handful of lines from Old Chief’s evidentiary richness discussion 
and uses them, without applying them to the facts of the case, to conclude 
that the 404(b) evidence was properly allowed.352 
The Eighth Circuit reasoned that because Old Chief held that evidence 
does not lose its relevance under Rule 401 when the defense offers to 
stipulate to the fact at issue, “it follows that Rule 404(b) evidence does not 
lose its relevance toward a permissible inference simply because the 
defendant offers to stipulate to that inference.”353  This conclusion, 
however, does not follow for multiple reasons:  first, the inference that the 
jurors must make for the evidence to have any probative worth is not a 
permissible one because past actions cannot prove intent for the current 
action;354 and second, while it is true that the evidence may not lose its 
relevance, it certainly loses some of its probative worth, which the court 
must still weigh against its risk of unfair prejudice.355  Admitting 404(b) 
evidence makes propensity inferences almost inescapable and should be 
excluded when uncontested because its probative worth is outweighed by 
its prejudicial effect.356  Regardless, a court abuses its discretion if it does 
not conduct a thorough Rule 403 balancing test, analyzing in what realistic 
 
 347. See Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 191.  Therefore, Old Chief should mandate that the 
Seventh Circuit does factor available alternative evidence into its Rule 403 balancing test.  
For a discussion of the holding in United States v. Connor, 583 F.3d 1011 (7th Cir. 2009), 
see supra notes 283–84 and accompanying text. 
 348. See FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee’s note; see also supra notes 34–37 and 
accompanying text. 
 349. See supra notes 229–30 and accompanying text. 
 350. See United States v. Hill, 249 F.3d 707, 713 (8th Cir. 2001). 
 351. See id. at 712.  But this is directly contrary to what Old Chief actually holds. See 
supra notes 171–73 and accompanying text; see also Kidd, supra note 46, at 257–58. 
 352. See Hill, 249 F.3d at 712–13. 
 353. See id. at 712 (citing Crowder II, 141 F.3d 1202, 2016 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc)). 
 354. Past crimes create too many narrative connections between past and present, 
permitting the jury to make character inferences. See Brooks, supra note 231, at 22. 
 355. See supra notes 271–77 and accompanying text (demonstrating how courts within 
the Second Circuit correctly conduct a Rule 403 balancing test). 
 356. See Sonenshein, supra note 55, at 216–17. 
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way the prosecution benefits from permitting the 404(b) evidence against 
the very real prejudice that may result.357 
Finally, it has been arguably problematic that the Court drew such a rigid 
distinction between the status element and all others.358  How would 
allowing evidence on the nature of Old Chief’s prior conviction to prove the 
status element of a felon-in-possession charge be any different than 
allowing Hill’s prior drug conviction to prove intent to distribute cocaine?  
In both cases, the defense offered to stipulate to the element that the 
evidence was intended to prove, and in both cases, the evidence was remote 
in time and should not have been a part of the prosecution’s narrative of the 
charged crime.359  In reality, both pieces of 404(b) evidence would be used 
to add richness to the government’s story about the man on trial, not about 
the act he is on trial for, which is, without question, impermissible.360  
There is no propensity-free chain that allows a juror to prove intent for a 
current drug conviction based on a past drug conviction that does not 
violate Rule 404(b).361  The Sixth Circuit understood as much and correctly 
prohibited this type of 404(b) evidence in Jenkins.362 
The Seventh Circuit, on the other hand, permits this exact type of 
evidence.363  The Seventh Circuit held that the government is free to reject 
a proffered stipulation and introduce 404(b) evidence of one’s past drug 
conviction because the stipulation does not have the same evidentiary 
richness as the 404(b) evidence.364  The court held that a stipulation does 
not have the same force as does sharing with the jury that a defendant, on 
trial for drug possession and distribution, has previously been convicted of 
the same crime.365  This is undoubtedly true, but the richness or force of the 
404(b) evidence causes prejudice by showing that the defendant has a 
propensity for committing the crime for which he is on trial.366  The past 
drug conviction played no part in the current crime and should not be part 
of the story that the prosecution wants to tell.367  Rule 404(b) evidence is 
supposed to be permitted when it is needed to prove an element of a crime, 
but if the element can be proved in a less prejudicial way—such as by 
stipulation—then it is not necessary to the prosecution’s narrative and 
should be excluded.368 
 
 357. See supra notes 34–39 and accompanying text. 
 358. See Duane, supra note 182, at 464 (suggesting that this extreme distinction might 
have been the price the majority paid to acquire Justice Kennedy’s vote); see also 
Thompson, supra note 47, at 72. 
 359. See supra notes 354, 356 and accompanying text. 
 360. See supra note 232 and accompanying text. 
 361. See Sonenshein, supra note 55, at 218. 
 362. See supra notes 257–61 and accompanying text. 
 363. See supra notes 287–92 and accompanying text (discussing the court’s holding in 
United States v. Williams, 238 F.3d 871 (7th Cir. 2001)). 
 364. See supra notes 287–92 and accompanying text. 
 365. See supra notes 287–92 and accompanying text. 
 366. See supra note 361 and accompanying text. 
 367. See supra notes 354–56 and accompanying text. 
 368. See Sonenshein, supra note 55, at 245. 
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B.  New Approach to 404(b) Evidence 
The foregoing discussion does not mean that 404(b) evidence should 
never be admissible.  There are many cases in which the defense does 
dispute an element or refuses to stipulate to an element and 404(b) evidence 
is needed for the government to meet its burden of proof.  This Note does 
not suggest that the government cannot prove its case in the way it sees fit, 
but it does take the position, similar to the Second Circuit, that an 
unequivocal stipulation to an element coupled with a “must convict” jury 
instruction is sufficient to meet the prosecution’s burden of proof on that 
element.  Part III.B.1 suggests a new unifying rule on when to admit or 
exclude 404(b) evidence.  Part III.B.2 provides a guideline for issuing 
limiting instructions when the court concludes that it is necessary to admit 
404(b) evidence. 
1.  404(b) Evidence on the Rule 403 Admissibility Scale 
In general, the Second Circuit’s approach to admission of 404(b) 
evidence is more sensitive to the prejudicial effects of 404(b) evidence than 
some of its counterparts.369  The court still relies on its pre-Old Chief test, 
while taking cognizance of Old Chief’s holdings.370  A new method for 
when to admit 404(b) evidence should be based off of the Second Circuit’s 
approach. 
If the prosecution wants to admit 404(b) evidence, the first step is to 
determine if the evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b).371  This Note is 
not suggesting a change to the circuit tests for whether a piece of evidence 
is admissible under this rule.372  The second step is for the trial judge to 
determine if the 404(b) evidence is admissible under Rule 403.373  In order 
to truly balance the evidence’s probative worth with its potential prejudicial 
effect, the judge should do so at the conclusion of the defendant’s case-in-
chief.374  This allows the judge to determine how necessary the evidence is 
for the prosecution to meet its burden of proof, which is the only way to 
properly weigh it against its prejudicial effect.375  In addition, if the issue is 
simply undisputed in the defendant’s case-in-chief, the defendant has two 
options:  first, leave the issue undisputed and let the judge analyze the 
404(b) evidence under the Rule 403 balancing test; or, second, offer an 
unequivocal stipulation to the element, acknowledging that the judge would 
be justified in sustaining objections to any cross examination or jury 
argument on the issue and in instructing the jury that if it finds all other 
elements proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then it “must convict” the 
 
 369. See supra notes 97–101 and accompanying text. 
 370. See supra notes 270–77 and accompanying text. 
 371. See supra notes 31–33 and accompanying text. 
 372. See supra notes 20, 27 and accompanying text. 
 373. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 374. See United States v. Figueroa, 618 F.2d 934, 939 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 375. See id.; see also supra notes 111–13 and accompanying text (demonstrating how the 
Eighth Circuit adopted this approach in United States v. Estabrook, 774 F.2d 284 (8th Cir. 
1985)). 
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defendant.376  In these instances, a “must convict” jury instruction is 
necessary to relieve the prosecution of its burden of proof on that 
element.377 
This test allows the judge ample discretion if the element is simply 
undisputed, but removes discretion if there is an unequivocal stipulation.  A 
stipulation, after all, is good evidence.378  The question the judge must ask 
is:  Does the stipulation give the prosecution everything it needs regarding 
the element?379  If it does, then the 404(b) evidence should be excluded.380  
If it does not, then the defense should stipulate to whichever point of the 
element it fails to meet, and if they refuse, then the stipulation should be 
subjected to the Rule 403 balancing test.381 
The concern that a jury might hold it against the prosecution if the 
prosecution does not present evidence that meets the jury’s expectations 
seems unfounded.382  Any “failure” by the prosecution to present this type 
of evidence is explained; the judge informs the jury that the point was 
admitted as true by the defense and grants the defense’s motion to order the 
prosecution not to present evidence on the point.383  The jury should care 
more about the fact that the element is proven than about how it was 
proved.384 
Finally, if the defense refuses to stipulate to the element and the judge is 
left balancing the evidence’s prejudicial effect against its probative worth, 
the judge should determine the probative value of 404(b) evidence by 
evaluating how necessary it is for the prosecution’s story.385  This should 
include analyzing if the evidence is needed to prove a disputed element and 
should prohibit factoring in the evidence’s ability to persuade the jury to 
make a moral judgment or mistaking its relevance to the defendant’s 
 
 376. See Figueroa, 618 F.2d at 938–39. 
 377. See supra notes 118–20 and accompanying text (explaining that a “must convict” 
jury instruction is more effective and easier to follow than a limiting instruction and should 
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limiting instruction). 
 378. See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172,186 (1997); see also supra note 184 
and accompanying text. 
 379. See Sonenshein, supra note 55, at 245. 
 380. See Walton, supra note 35, at 1087 (noting that the only legitimate purpose of 
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accompanying text. 
 381. See supra note 376 and accompanying text. 
 382. See Duane, supra note 182, at 465–66 (“[Old Chief] cites no authority to support that 
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accompanying text. 
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 384. See supra note 223 and accompanying text.  In contrast to Donnie L. Kidd’s belief, a 
voter certainly cares more about who won an election than the story about how the 
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 385. See supra Part I.C.1.b. (explaining the narrow holding of Old Chief). 
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character with its relevance to the actual story of the current crime.386  If the 
evidence does add to the narrative of the currently alleged crime in a way 
that is not already available, and it is not outweighed by its prejudicial 
effect, then it may be permitted.387  The 404(b) evidence cannot add to the 
narrative, however, by providing an “evidentiary richness” that invites the 
jury to make character inferences.388  A limiting jury instruction is no cure 
for what goes on subconsciously in a juror’s mind.389 
2.  The Effect of Limiting Jury Instructions 
Although limiting instructions cannot erase what one has learned,390 
courts continually use them under the guise that the jury will be able to do 
just that.391  Logic indicates that a jury is not capable of using evidence in 
solely the way the judge proscribes, simply ignoring it when it comes to the 
general question of guilt.392  In addition, the Federal Rules of Evidence 
require that trial judges consider the lack of effectiveness in limiting 
instructions when weighing the 404(b) evidence on the Rule 403 balancing 
scale.393 
The lack of effectiveness of limiting instructions is abundantly clear 
when one looks at some of the limiting instructions courts issue when 
permitting 404(b) evidence at trial.  For instance, in Jenkins, the district 
court instructed the jury to use the 404(b) evidence “to the extent that [it] 
may determine [the testimony] might be relevant to the issue of 
knowledge.”394  Besides the fact that this instruction is unclear, it 
diminishes the possibility that the 404(b) evidence is even probative in the 
first place.395  The Sixth Circuit correctly overturned the lower court in this 
case, holding that a limiting instruction is not a magic potion that can cure 
the prejudicial effects of 404(b) evidence.396 
In contrast, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s admission of 
404(b) evidence in Williams, holding that a limiting instruction informing 
the jury that it should consider the testimony “on the question of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity and absence of 
 
 386. Compare supra notes 225, 232 (demonstrating how the D.C. and Eighth Circuits 
incorrectly analyzed 404(b) evidence in overturning their jurisprudence), with supra note 
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mistake or accident” was sufficient.397  This type of instruction is too 
confusing for even someone well versed in the law to understand, let alone 
the average citizen.398  If 404(b) evidence is permitted at trial, then the 
judge needs to ensure that a clear, understandable limiting instruction is 
given.399 
A limiting instruction would be more effective if it directly referenced 
the prohibition on using any evidence to make inferences about one’s 
character or that the defendant acted in character in the currently alleged 
crime.400  The judge should explain that “it does not follow from a 
defendant’s past acts that he committed the particular crime charged in the 
[present] case.”401  Finally, the judge should explain that making this type 
of character inference does not help the prosecution meet its burden of 
proof and if that inference is needed for a juror to conclude guilt, then it is 
not sufficient.402  A limiting instruction meeting these parameters would at 
least ensure that the jury understands why the judge is asking it to do the 
impossible.403  This type of instruction, combined with the test laid out in 
Part III.B.1, should provide a more reasonable approach to the admission of 
404(b) evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
The standards among the lower courts on when to admit 404(b) evidence 
at trial are inconsistent.  While most circuits include a Rule 403 analysis in 
their tests for admissibility, its implementation in practice is less certain.  
When a defendant offers to concede to an element that the 404(b) evidence 
is meant to prove, the standards are even murkier.  Old Chief resolved the 
conflict among the lower courts as to the status element, but it also 
introduced the concepts of narrative integrity and evidentiary richness, 
opening the door for lower courts to stray further away from what Rules 
404(b) and 403 stand for.  Trial courts should reevaluate their test for 
404(b) admissibility under Rule 403 and adopt a method that accepts 
unequivocal stipulations and a “must convict” jury instruction as sufficient 
alternative evidence for meeting the prosecution’s burden of proof on an 
element.  In the absence of alternative proof, trial courts should reconsider 
the efficacy of limiting jury instructions and make sure to provide 
constructive and clear instructions to the jury when they are necessary. 
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